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Earnings management could be described as when a manager alters the financial report of a firm
to portray a better picture of it. There are several factors which could be motivating managers to
do this, but Healy & Wahlen (1999) finds that misleading stakeholders or influencing contractual
outcomes are the most common ones. Managing earnings could be done through different tech-
niques but the literature discusses mainly three different methods, namely: Accrual-based ( Jones,
1991), real earnings management ( Roychowdhury, 2006) and classification shifting (McVay , 2006)
Classification shifting is a fairly new and little researched topic in the earnings management field.
The methodology for investigating classification shifting was developed by McVay (2006), and her
model has in the later years been modified by both Athanasakou et al. (2009) and Fan  et al.
(2010). The method examines if firms shifts expenses from recurring to non-recurring items in
the financial statement, with the result of core earnings being increased. The main benefits for
using this method on the contrary to both accrual-based and real earnings management methods,
is among others that it leaves the net income unchanged. In addition it‘s not mean reverting like
accrual-based methods are. This makes it harder for the users and auditors of the financial report
to detect.
As classification shifting increases core earnings it will at the same time increase the alternative
performance measures that relies on core earnings, such as earnings before interest taxes deprecia-
tion and amortization (EBITDA). Reporting of alternative performance measures have in the later
years become more widely used in the financial reporting, and has shown to have a valuation effect
(Bhattacharya et al., 2004; Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002; Doyle et al., 2003). As some of these alter-
native performance measures are based upon core earnings, it seems highly relevant to investigate
whether or not an extensive use of such measures is related to expense shifting or not. Increasing
core earnings and at the same time highlighting them through the use of alternative performance
measures, could take the user‘s attention away from a worse net income result. The main objective
of this paper is therefore to see if firms that tend to give prominence to alternative performance
measures in their financial statements make use of classification shifting. As it turns out that firms
who give prominence to alternative performance measures in their financial statements often are
more leveraged (Lougee & Marquardt, 2004), this relationship is also researched in this paper. I
also see how different debt levels acts as a motivation for firms to shift expenses.
A study that combines these factors together might be interesting due to several factors. First
it might be an indication that IFRS is too flexible and relies too much on managerial judgment.
Second it might be an indication for that alternative performance measure should be regulated.
Third as some debt covenants are based upon alternative performance measures, e.g. EBITDA it
could act as a cautionary tale for creditors to reconsider the use of such covenants. Fourth it could
also be a red flag for shareholders who most likely will buy an overvalued company if classification
shifting techniques is used.
This has led to the following research questions:
To what extend do firms who give prominence to alternative performance measures engage
in classification shifting of expenses?
Are firms who give prominence to alternative performance measures more leveraged, and to
what extend do different debt ratios affect firms decision to engage in classification shifting
of expenses?
2
To investigate this I use a Norwegian context, mostly because of its strong institutional environment
and investor protection (Hope et al., 2009). Earnings management are according to An et al.
(2016) more pronounced in weaker institutional environments, making eventual results transferable
to regions with weaker institutional environments. Fan et al. (2012) shows that a firms capital
structure is highly influenced by the institutional environment of the firm‘s location. Firms located
in strong institutional environments are often less leveraged, however Norwegian companies are
one of the most leveraged countries in their research sample. This makes a Norwegian context
particularly relevant. My sample consists of 117 firms continuously listed on the Oslo Stock
Exchange in the period 2014 - 2019, adding up to 585 firm years.
The results shows that there exsist a positive and significant relationship between unexpected
core earnings and non-recurring expenses, which means that Norwegian firms do see classification
shifting as a viable earnings management method. When including the interaction between al-
ternative performance measures and non-recurring expenses this relationship gets stronger. This
points towards that firms who give prominence to alternative performance measures in their finan-
cial statements are unequivocally motivated to shift expenses. Motivated by Thanh et al. (2020),
who finds different threshold levels on different debt ratios and classification shifting, my results
confirms that these threshold levels are to some extend valid in this context as well. High financial
debt motivates firms to shift expenses while low total debt provides similar results, however modest
in comparison to the financial debt. I do however not find any evidence that points towards the
fact that firms who tend to give prominence to alternative performance measures in their financial
statements are higher leveraged.
In the next section I present the theoretical perspectives used in this research, followed by the
methods. The scientific article follows afterwards.
2.0 Theory
In this section theoretical aspects regarding earnings management, including classification shifting
are described. The fundamental aspect that enables earnings management, the agency theory
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) as well as the principle based IFRS is described first. Second the
theory behind earnings management, starting with the traditional accrual-based and real earnings
management methods are introduced, before explaining the rationale behind classification shift-
ing as first described by McVay (2006). Furthermore, theoretical aspects that motivates firms
management to engage in such techniques are discussed. Lastly the lack of decision usefulness of
alternative performance measures is discussed.
2.1 Agency theory
Agency theory was first introduced by Jensen & Meckling (1976) and explains the relationship
between a principal and an agent, and how they might have conflicting interests. Since both
parts has fundamentally the same goal as to maximize their own value, there might be a situation
where the interest of the two parts are diverging. The principal, or the shareholder might wish to
maximize the firm value. On the other side the agent, or the firms management wishes to maximize
their salary (Eisenhardt, 1989). The agent might exploit the fact that there exists information
asymmetry between the two parts to their benefit, at the expense of the principal. Shareholders
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have limited access to company information, except from what the company are regulated to or
choose to publicly disclose. Such a gap might be exploited by the firms manager by engaging in
earnings management techniques. However, this gap may be closed, at least to some extend by
making sure the agent and the principal share the same goal. Stock- or options plans are according
to Agrawal & Mandelker (1987) one way one can reduce managerial incentive problems.
Accounting reports should provide credible information to investors and stakeholders, so that they
can base their decision upon it. Oppourtunistically accouting, or earnings management exploits
the agency theory to the benefit of the agent. Since the agent by nature have more information,
the management could engage in earnings management techniques to their benefit. By using such
methods the agent achives their goal of providing adjusted accounting information that seems
credible, and at the same time is very difficult for the principal to detect.
2.2 IFRS as an arena
In 2005 the European Union (EU) adopted the International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS), the standards are developed and maintained by the International Accounting Standard
Board (IASB). The EU have made it a requirement for listed companies to use IFRS in their
financial reporting, and since Norway is a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), IFRS
applies to companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange as well.
Financial information from a company that reports after IFRS shall have some qualitative char-
acteristics, which should help to close the gap between the agent and the principal. These are
described in the IFRS (2018) conceptual framework. Based upon a cost and benifit decision fi-
nancial reports should be understandable and have decision usefulness. This so that the users of
the financial report could base their decision upon the information given. The users of a finan-
cial statement include among other investors, creditors, lenders, customers, suppliers, government,
employees and other stakeholders. IASB sets out to increase transparency and accountability in
financial reports, through a set of standards that should make entities financial reports decision
useful. Relevance and faithful representation together are supposed to make a financial statement
decision useful. Accounting information is relevant if it has predictive and / or confirmatory value.
These are often interconnected in such a way that if there is confirmatory value it is most often
also predictive. Information is faithfully representative if it is complete, neutral and free from
error. Although this is not always achievable, one should strive to enhance these qualities as much
as possible to make the accounting information as faithful representative as one can IFRS (2018).
Further, the aim of introducing IFRS in the EU is to increase reporting quality and comparability
between similar companies located in different countries. Before the introduction of IFRS they
reported after local general accepted accounting principles (GAAP), that could be different from
country to country. As IFRS standards are principle-based they do open up for more managerial
judgment than former rule-based accounting practices does.
IAS 1 - Presentation of the Financial Statements is the standard that regulates the presentation of
financial position, statement of profit or loss and other comprehensive income (income statement
and OCI), statement of changes in equity, cash flow statement, and the notes to these statements.
This standard requires that the income and expenses that is recognized in one period shall be
presented in the income statement. The presentation of these is up to the managers judgment, for
example decisions on what to include in the recurring and non-recurring sections are not strictly
regulated.
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Studies show that classification shifting have become more prevalent after the introduction of IFRS.
In the UK, Athanasakou et al. (2009) finds evidence for accrual-based earnings management in
the pre-IFRS period, but fails to find strong evidence for classification shifting. Later Zalata 
& Roberts (2017) finds strong evidence for classification shifting happening in the UK after the
implementation of IFRS. One of the explanations they provide is the fact that IFRS grants more
room for managerial judgment, which again makes classification shifting more viable than for
example accrual-based and real earnings management techniques.
2.3 Earnings management
Although there is no official definition of earnings management, the most cited one is from Healy
& Wahlen (1999) who defines it like this:
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in financial reporting and
in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders
about the underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.
In other words, earnings management are deliberate actions from the management of the entity
that affects the financial statement in one way or another but is still within the law. It is on
the boarder to fraud, yet it is not fraud. The litterature reveals that there are different methods
that could be used, and a manager that chooses to make use of one of these methods must take
into consideration both the cost and benefit that applies to the different techniques. As different
managers will have different motivations for applying these methods, the managers incentive will
also have a saying in what kind of technique that is choosen.
Managing earnings could be done in a variety of ways, and managers of firms seems versatile and
willing to change their methods as the external environment changes. The first method researched
was accrual-based methods (see DeAngelo, 1986; Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Healy, 1985;  Jones, 1991).
Later  Roychowdhury (2006) model is commonly used for detecting real activities management.
According to Kothari et al. (2016) the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), that was introduced after the
Enron and Worldcom scandals, was a participating reason for why firms seemed to move away
from accrual-based methods to real earnings management methods.
In the later years, after the implementation of more principal-based accounting rules (IFRS) it
seems that firms have once again found a way to exploit a regulatory gap. Classification shifting
techniques seems now to be more used by firms as a substitution for both accrual-based and real
earnings management methods. Classification shifting of expenses was first researched by McVay 
(2006), European and Asian studies have in the later years confirmed her findings (Nagar & Sen,
2016; Zalata & Roberts, 2016; Zalata & Roberts, 2017). There has also been found evidence
for that revenues are shifted with the same intention as expense shifting, increased core earnings
(Malikov et al., 2018).
2.3.1 Accrual-based earnings management
Accruals are defined as the difference in net income and cash flows. There are many ways accru-
als are created, for example due to depreciation, write-offs, changes in accounting standards or
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methods etc. This is normal, but managers can choose to increase or decrease income through so
called discretionary accruals and this way portray a better or worse result than the acctual one.
Discretionary accruals are found by subtracting total accruals from non-discretionary accruals.
This method increases or decreases current year earnings, at the cost of next years earnings The
most widely used model today to discover the use of such techniques is the Jones-model ( Jones,
1991).
However as Kothari (2001) points out, none of the five models that are most commonly used
to detect accrual-based earnings management captures serial correlation between accruals. This
means that calculated discretionary accruals may be biased and contain non-discretionary accruals.
As such, real earnings management models and classification shifting techniques can better capture
if a company actually conducts earnings management than accrual models do. Accruals are also
mean reverting, and as it happens at the end of the year it is easier for auditors to detect than
other methods. In other words, it comes with a both greater cost than and is easier to detect as
for example classification shifting techniques which do not revert to the mean and is difficult to
detect.
2.3.2 Real earnings management
Real earnings management happens when managers yield from normal business activities in the
context of timing and structuring, with the intention of reaching some form of financial result.
Cashflow from operations, production cost and discretionary expenses are variables used to detect
earnings manipulation around the zero earnings threshold. Examples of this could be timing of a
sale of an asset to make a revenue in the current period, even though it is not the most beneficial
thing to do for the firm at that moment (Bartov, 1993). Increasing production to lower the cost
of goods sold, or sell goods at a discount to increase sale are other examples which  Roychowdhury
(2006) points out. Her evidence points towards that managers tend not only to use accrual-based
methods but also real earnings management methods in combination. Thus, to look at accrual-
based methods alone will most likely not convey true results. Graham et al. (2005) points to the
fact that real earnings management can be impossible to reverse, and as such good opportunities
may be lost forever. 80% of managers in U.S. firms are according to their research willing to
decrease certain expenses like R&D and maintenance, while 55% of the correspondents were willing
to postpone a positive NPV-project to meet an earnings target. This shows that reaching certain
accounting targets are higher valued than achieving higher cash flows into the firm. Since real
earnings management affects the operations and it is not a choice of accounting method, it is more
difficult for an auditor to get suspicious about than it is for accrual-based methods. However, it
might come at a greater cost as firms may lose opportunities or sell assets that could generate
more cash in the future.
Real earnings management could destroy value and Graham et al. (2005) explains it as a struggle
between short-term need to deliver accounting results, and long-term objective of maximizing the
value of investment decisions. Kothari et al. (2016) points out that since real activities are not
regulated under GAAP, nor under IFRS like accrual methods are, managers judgment will play a
greater part in the operating strategies of the firm making real earnings management less evident
for outsiders.
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2.3.3 Classification shifting of expenses
McVay (2006) introduces classification shifting of expenses, and defines it as “the deliberate mis-
classification of items within the income statement.” In her study she focuses on classification shift-
ing of core expenses to special items, or shifting expenses from recurring items to non-recurring
items. The model used is analogous to Jones-model ( Jones, 1991), but focuses on misclassification
expenses. Managing earnings through classifications shifting comes with lesser cost for those who
make use of it, and its also easier to manage earnings this way than through accruals or real earn-
ings management methods. By deducting core expenses from net sales, the core earnings which also
is called operating earnings will increase, while net income remains unaffected (Zalata & Roberts,
2017). Unlike real earnings management methods this does not involve any business transactions
that can affect the actual economic performance of a entity. Firms that use classification shifting
of expenses one year will however have high unexpected special item expenses, which will not be
present the following year.
Another way of using classification shifting is on the basis of inflating revenues, with the intention
of articficially increasing core earnings just like expense shifting does. Malikov et al. (2018) finds
that UK firms misclassify non-operating revenues as operating revenues, and that managers tend
to favor this instead of expenses shifting as analytics and other users tend to value an increase
income more as to a decrease in expenses.
Classification shifting comes at a lower cost than accrual-based and real earnings management
methods do. In addition, this technique does not reverse in later years as accruals-based methods,
nor does it end up with forgone returns or affect the cash flow like real earnings management
methods. It is also less likely to be discovered by auditors, regulators, or other users since it does
not affect net income. The principle based IFRS do open up for the use of managerial judgment,
giving firms an opportunity to misclassify expenses. Thus, it seems that fter the implementation
of IFRS, classification shifting is more and more used as a substitute for both accrual- and real
earnings management techniques.
2.4 Motivations for earnings management
The second part of Healy & Wahlen (1999) definition refers to incentives or motivation behind the
managers decision to engage in earnings management. Motivational factors are usually divided into
three categories in the earnings management literature: Capital market motivations, contracting
motivations, and regulatory motivational factors.
Capital market motivations
Information asymmetry exist due to the fact that insiders of the firm knows more than what
outsiders do, also referred to as the agency-problem. This skewness in information access, creates
inside information which managers can take advantage of through earnings management. Thomas
(2002) reveals that diversified firms have a higher degree of information asymmetry, and are less
transparent than non-diversified firms. Moreover, Rodríguez-Pérez & van Hemmen (2010) results
show that high leveraged and diversified Spanish firms are more likely to use earnings management
techniques to improve their performance. Therefore, it seems like diversification opens up for
earnings management.
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Meeting analysts’ forecasts may also be a motivation to commence in earnings management.  Roy-
chowdhury (2006) finds some evidence that managers engage in real earnings management to meet
analysts’ annual forecast. Bartov (1993) finds that managers in firms with decreasing annual earn-
ings, the sale of assets is higher than for firms that experience an increase in earnings. Thus,
earnings are smoothed through sale of assets to keep stable reported earnings.
Contracting motivations
Each company is different when it comes to type of operation, what kind of life stage they are
in, their capital structure, if they pay dividends or not etc. The composition of the specific firm
will bring with its different sets of contracts, which depending on the firm managers and their
relationship to the specific contract can motivate to engage in earnings management.
Debt contracts may include covenants that if certain thresholds are approaching or goals are not
met, interest rates may increase, penalties may be applied, or the loan being called. Firms with debt
covenants may have incentives to manage earnings if the firm is approaching these.  Roychowdhury
(2006) finds that firms with debt outstanding (used as a proxy for leverage) manages earnings.
Bartov (1993) finds that there is a positive correlation between income from asset sales, and debt
to equity ratio. Malikov et al. (2019) also investigates the use of earnings management in UK firms
for firms with EBITDA-based covenants, and find that firms with tight covenant slack engages
in earnings management through classification shifting of revenues. Also, before seeking debt
financing Zalata & Roberts (2017) finds that UK firms are more motivated to manage earnings
through classification shifting. The relationship between debt and earnings management is however
not always that clear. Ghosh & Moon (2010) and Thanh et al. (2020) finds evidence for that
there exist a non-linear relationship between debt and earnings management. When total liabilities
exceed approximately 60% of total assets firms seems motivated to engage in classification shifting.
The same threshold lies around 33% for financial, or interest-bearing debt (Thanh et al., 2020).
Regulatory motivations
All industries are regulated in one way or another and often these are connected to accounting num-
bers, the banking sector for example have strict regulatory capital structure restrictions. Meeting
regulatory requirements can sometimes be difficult to overcome for companies, which can lead to
the use of earnings management.
On the other, side regulations may open up for earnings management as it seems that IFRS do
through its demand for managerial judgment (Zalata & Roberts, 2017). This is supported by
Jeanjean & Stolowy (2008) who finds that the level of earnings management did not decline after
the implementation of IFRS in Australia and UK, while in France it actually increased.
Other motivational factors
The above-mentioned motivational factors are not exhaustive, and there may be many other incen-
tives for managers to engage in earnings management. Big baths, or reports of big losses, happens
when managers take advantage of a poor result that evidentially cannot be avoided. Through
earnings management the manager will make a loss even bigger than it actually is to make future
results appear better. First investigated by Healy (1985), who found evidence that if earnings are
low and certain targets is unable to be met regardless of what is done, managers have incentives
to take big baths. This could be done through write-offs or deferring revenues, which in turn will
increase the possibility that the firm will reach its goals in the future.
Macroeconomic events may also motivate managers to engage in earnings management, as Kjær-
land et al. (2020) finds that managers exploit macroeconomic crises, here a collapse in the oil
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price, to manage earnings and at the same time uses a big bath strategy.
2.5 Alternative performance measures
To ensure decision usefulness of a financial statement, IFRS clearly states what kind of performance
measures that are mandatory and shall be included in the entities financial reports. However, there
has become almost a customary practice among reporting companies to utilize so-called alternative
performance measures (APM). They are called alternative because they are not mandatory to
report after IFRS and are also referred to as non-IFRS measures, adjusted performance measures,
pro forma measures or pro forma earnings. Examples of these are earnings before interest and
taxation (EBIT), and earnings before interest depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). These
are not defined in IFRS (2018) conceptual framework , or any of the IFRS accounting standards.
As such, it is not mandatory for firms that uses IFRS to report EBITDA or any other adjusted
variant of it. Still EBITDA is a very important reporting figure, and almost all listed companies
report some form of EBITDA either adjusted or un-adjusted.
Since reporting of alternative performance measures are not regulated in any way there is a lot of
variety in how these are conveyed. In addition, many companies report adjusted measures instead
of “clean” figures, for example X-EBITDA or EBITDAX. Some companies that evidentially reports
clean EBITDA, actually use adjusted figures in their reported number (Mey & Lamprecht, 2020).
Such alterations makes the measure unfaithful and gives it a lack of comparability, which again
makes it a performance measure on which the users should not base their decisions upon. In other
words, it might be difficult to understand how the performance measure is calculated since it is
not always explained by the entity. The labels are unclear and it is difficult to interpret how
one can relate it to other amounts in the financial statement, as companies often seems to be
inconsistent in their reporting of such performance measurements. In addition it happens that
these measures, which can be one-sided and biased are given more prominence in the financial
statements than mandatory IFRS reporting measures are (Bhattacharya et al., 2004; Bradshaw &
Sloan, 2002). Additionally, Doyle et al. (2003) finds that companies that uses pro forma earnings
often exclude non-recurring expenses in their financial statements. This fools the market as they
do not see through this, and values the company higher than it would be by including these omitted
expenses.
However, if alternative performance measures are portrayed correctly by the firm there is little
doubt that these can be helpful for users of financial statements. Mandatory IFRS measures
might not suit every firm equally good, they can provide additional information and give a better
understanding of the financial performance of an entity. Flexibility in the reporting can help
certain firms to highlight their performance by the use of alternative performance measures, which
could help reduce the agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This has led to a widespread
interest and debate among other the IFRS board if one should try to regulate pro forma measures,
or the use of them (IASB, 2017).
Helleren & Stige (2017) research is in line with Mey & Lamprecht (2020) when it comes the
lack of comparability of EBITDA across different firms in Norwegian companies. This is due
to the fact that the measure is used differently by firms with respect to what kind of numbers
they choose to include in the figure. They also found that bigger sized firms have a stronger
tendency to report some form of EBITDA, than smaller sized companies. To add to this The
Financial Supervision Authority of Norway (2017) did a survey where 228 firms reported their
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use of alternative performance measures. 68% reported that they use one or more of these in
their financial statements, with EBIDTA as clearly the most used (63%). EBIT (42%) adjusted
EBITDA (30%) and adjusted EBIT (18%) are also widely used among Norwegian companies.
Furthermore, even though EBITDA has rather low decision usefulness it is still used as a covenant
in some debt contracts. Companies that have this type of covenant do manage earnings not to
breach any covenants that lies upon the firm (Malikov et al., 2019;  Roychowdhury, 2006). Further,
Zalata & Roberts (2017) also points out that since higher earnings today in an analyst or creditor
context means higher earnings in the future, thus there is less risk for default. Less risk for default
means less credit risk and lower interest rates for the firm. As it is fairly difficult to see through
classification shifting techniques, firms that seek debt financing are more likely to make use of such
methods. Financially distressed companies are according to Nagar & Sen (2016) more likely to
value pro forma earnings and more likely to report special items in their financial statement. They
also find evidence for that these companies also engage in classification shifting.
A high use of alternative performance measure can be used by companies because mandatory
performance measures does not fit the specific company very good. Another reason might be that
they want to disguise a poorer underlying result. This could be done through shifting recurring
items to non-recurring items which will increase some alternative performance measures, while
leaving net income unchanged. Thus, a high use of alternative performance measures might be an
indication that the company utilizes earnings management.
3.0 Data and methods
In this chapter I first describe how the theory of science fits into this research. Next the sample
selection and models used are described. Thereafter, I explain how the panel data used is tested
and adjusted to be statistical valid in addition to a justification for its external reliability. Lastly
the ethical considerations in this research are briefly discussed.
3.1 Theory of science
Researching the phenomena of classification shifting requires a lot of data, preferably both in
time and cross-sectional series, which is also referred to as panel data. Interpretation of this
quantitative dataset is best done by using a deductive approach. Researching a priori knowledge
requires that one defines the hypotheses upon already existing theory, which further is used to
base the conclusion on. The fall pit here is that the hypotheses must be clearly defined and based
upon existing evidence, as researching and concluding upon a false hypothesis might lead you to
a wrong conclusion. This positivists research design goes well with the researcher’ rationalistic
ontology.
3.2 Sample selection
The sample consist of Norwegian firms that are continuously listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange
in the period 2014 to 2019. The analysis period is between 2015 - 2019, but as some of the
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variables are lagged it requires data from 201423. The total sample consist of 117 firms that in
total adds up to 585 firm years, and is collected through the Proff Forvalt database. In line with
other similar studies the financial and utilities sector are not included as a part of this study (Fan  
et al., 2010; McVay , 2006; Nagar & Sen, 2016; Zalata & Roberts, 2017). All sectors included
have more than six firm-year observations included (Athanasakou et al., 2009). I use the global
industry classification standard (GCIS) for classifying industries, and due to the low number of
firms available in the telecom sector it has been merged with the IT sector. Since sales is used as
a scalar in most of the variables, firms with less than NOK 10 mill. in revenues are excluded as
well. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99%.
Data for if firms tend to prominate alternative performance measures (APM) are collected manually
through the firms annual reports in the sample period. From the total sample, I find that 243 out
of 585 (41.54%) firm year observations tend to give more prominence to non-IFRS measures than
to regulatory IFRS measures in their financial statements.
3.3 Models
Managers that engage in classification shifting aims to shift either revenues or expenses4, to increase
core earnings. Core earnings are those earnings that is connected to the normal operations of a
firm, and are expected to reoccur every year. In other words it is net income added non-recurring
expenses, and special items. Non-recurring and special items will be those who are infrequent,
or unusual in the firms normal operations. Examples of these can be write-offs, research and
development cost, goodwill impairment etc.
The methodology used in this paper follows Zalata & Roberts (2017) on measuring classification
shifting of expenses. They build on McVay (2006) models, who first found evidence of misclassi-
fication of non-recurring as recurring expenses through her changes model. McVay (2006) models
the expected core earnings of a firm with relation to other performance measures, and is estimated
for firm i in year t. She found that core earnings could be estimated through the firms past period
core earnings, asset turnover, this period and previous period accruals, and the change in sales.
Zalata & Roberts (2017) however does not make use of current period accruals as Fan  et al. (2010)
recommends this exclusion. Including current period accruals may lead to a mechanically posi-
tive relationship between non-recurring items and unexpected core earnings and should therefore
be omitted. Based upon this the model used for finding estimated core earnings is as follows,
estimated by industry and fiscal year:
𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑇 𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4Δ𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5Δ𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (1)
As the dependent variable reported core earnings scaled by sales, (𝐶𝐸) is used for firm i in year t.
Core earnings will be net income added tax expenses, net financial items, depreciation, amortization
and impairments. As core earnings is expected to be fairly stable, lagged core earnings is used
2Firms listed on Oslo Axess are also included.
3This is to ensure that firms report after IFRS, as it is mandatory to report after IFRS to be listed on the stock
exchange.
4This study do only look at classification shifting of expenses.
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as the first explanatory variable (𝐶𝐸𝑡−1). 𝐴𝑇 𝑂 is the asset turnover ratio, which is net sales
divided by average net operating assets. Net operating assets are operating assets less operating
liabilities. It is included because companies will always attempt to utilize assets efficiently and
therefore maximize the return on assets, hence there will be a inverse relationship between asset
turnover and profit margin. Total operating lagged accruals (𝑇 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡−1) is found by subtracting
lagged operating cash flow from operations from lagged net income scaled by lagged sales. Since
future performance is related to past accruals, this will capture the information content of last
period accruals for current period earnings. As previously mentioned, contemporaneous accruals
can create a mechanically positive relationship between non-recurring items and unexpected core
earnings, therefore they are excluded from this model (Fan  et al., 2010). Δ𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 is the net
percentage change in net sales and is included to capture the impact that sales growth has on fixed
costs. Δ𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 are the same as Δ𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠, if this figure is negative. It is included to adjust for
any un-utilized resources that still exists within the firm in case of falling levels of activity. If sales
growth is positive Δ𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 is used while Δ𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 is 0, and opposite.
The difference in reported core earnings and expected core earnings will be unexpected core earn-
ings (𝑈𝐶𝐸). Model (1) is used to calculate the expected core earnings for firm i in year t. In
line with Zalata & Roberts (2017), I then use model (2) to find evidence for misclassification of
recurring expenses as non-recurring expenses.
𝑈𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (2)
Non-recurring items (𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶) is calculated as the reported core earnings less net income, scaled
by sales. Income-decreasing items will be positive, while income-increasing items will be negative
and are similar to Zalata & Roberts (2017) set to 0.
Control variables are added to the model, and these are meant to capture firm characteristics
which can affect the level of earnings management. Size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) is the natural log of total assets.
Leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉 ) is long term debt scaled by equity. Operating cash flow (𝑂𝐶𝐹 ) is cash flow from
operations scaled by lagged total assets. Return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴) is net income divided by lagged
total assets. Market to book value (𝑀𝐵𝑉 ) is the market value of the firm (measured at year end),
divided by book value of equity.
To investigate if Norwegian firms that give alternative performance measures (APM) more promi-
nence over IFRS measures in their financial statements tries to increase core earnings through
misclassification of expenses, I modify model (2). By adding the variable 𝐴𝑃𝑀 and its interaction
with 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶, I get model (3).
𝑈𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (3)
I this model, APM (alternative performance measure) is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if four
or more of the following conditions are met, and 0 otherwise5. This data is manually collected
through the firms annual reports.
5These are qualitative measures stated by the U.S. SEC (2018) in which they rely on to evaluate if non-GAAP
measures are given more prominence than regulatory GAAP measures.
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• Presentation of a full separate income statement containing only non-IFRS measures within
the annual report.
• Presentation of non-IFRS measures within the first ten pages of the annual report, without
presenting IFRS measures within these first ten pages.
• A heading or a caption in the annual report that includes non-IFRS measures, but does not
include a comparable IFRS measure.
• Presenting a non-IFRS measure using a presentation style that emphasizes the non-IFRS
measure over the comparable IFRS measure, if a comparable measure is mentioned.
• A IFRS measure that is followed directly by non-IFRS measure anywhere in the annual
report.
• Describing in any way a non-IFRS measure as exceptional (or any other synonym), without
equally describing a comparable IFRS measure.
• Presenting non-IFRS measures in a tabular format, without including comparable IFRS
measure in the same or another table.
• Discussing or analyzing a non-IFRS measure, without having a similar discussion or analysis
of a comparable IFRS measure with equal or greater prominence.
This approach is a modification as of the approach used by Bhattacharya et al. (2004), Lougee 
& Marquardt (2004), Black et al. (2017) and  Laurion (2020) who uses different pro forma search
strings both to identify firms non-GAAP practices, and to classify them as non-GAAP firms.
Differentiating firms who rely on alternative performance measures with this method is more
thorough than the aforementioned ones. It could also provide new insight on how to identify and
classify firms who have an extensive use of alternative performance measures in their financial
statements.
To examine who different debt levels affect a firms manager decision to engage in classification
shifting, I follow Thanh et al. (2020). They find that firms are more willing to engage in earnings
management if the total liabilities to assets exceed approximately 60%, and if the total financial
debt to total assets exceed approximately 33%. The two explanatory variables used are respectively
𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 and 𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 .
𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 is calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. 𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 includes only the
financial debt or interest bearing debt, and is calculated as long term debt + current portion debt
+ notes payable divided by total assets.
𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 = 𝑇 𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑇 𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 = 𝑇 𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇 𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
If LDEBT and FDEBT is higher than 60% and 33% of total assets respectively it is set to 1, and
0 otherwise. Adding the control variables 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 , 𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 and their interactions with 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶
to model (2), I get model (4).
𝑈𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡, 𝑥 𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 (4)
+ 𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑀𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
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As the literature indicates that there is a non-linear relationship between debt levels and earnings
management model (4) is run again, but this time with LDEBT and FDEBT set to 1 if the debt
levels are lower than 60% and 33%, otherwise they are set to 0.
3.4 Internal validity and reliability
Results from the modeled core earnings are shown in Table 1 below. 𝐶𝐸𝑡−1, Δ𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 and
Δ𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 all have positive sign, while 𝐴𝑇 𝑂 and 𝑇 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡−1 have negative signs. This is as
predicted, and in line with what McVay (2006) finds in her research. All coefficients are significant
at the 1% and 5% except for 𝐴𝑇 𝑂 which is not significant. The adjusted 𝑅2 of 0.769 shows that
the model has great explanatory power. This is also consistent with McVay (2006). To check for
heteroskedasticity I ran a Breush-Pagan test, which resulted in a p-value of 0,00 indicating the
presence of heteroskedasticity. To compensate for this, I introduced robust standard errors to the
regression model.















Year Fixed Effects Yes




F Statistic 390.000∗∗∗ (df = 5; 575)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors are given in in parantheses.
The parameters are estimated based on the following model:
𝐶𝐸i,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸i,t + 𝛽2𝐴𝑇 𝑂i,t + 𝛽3𝑇 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡i,t
+𝛽4Δ𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠i,t + 𝛽5Δ𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠i,t + 𝜖i,t
The other panel-data models used in the scientific article (Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7) are all run
with Industry and Year as fixed effects. A Hausman test, with the null being that random effects
are preferred (Green, 2003), is run first showing that fixed effects are the preferred model for all
except for the two last regressions in Table 7. For these two the Breusch-Pagan Larange Multiplier
test reveals that pooled OLS is favored. However, as I run these as both random effects models
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and pooled models there are only negligible differences in the results, and I stick to fixed-effects
for all models.
Further, I test for serial-correlation under the null of no serial-correlation with a Breusch-Godfrey
test (Green, 2003). The results reveal that the data sets does not suffer from any serial correlation
issues.
Lastly a Pesaran‘s CD test shows with the null being the existence of cross-sectional dependence,
that all models except 2 and 4 suffer from cross-sectional dependence. Also, for all models the
Breusch-Pagan Test shows serious heteroscedasticity, with the null being a homoscedastic dataset.
I correct all models by for both issues by introducing robust standard errors to them (Green, 2003).
Multicollinearity issues could lead to a high 𝑅2 but also high standard errors for each individual
coefficient. To check for this the correlation matrix in Table 4 is investigated, and the highest
correlation coefficients is ROA and CFO which positively correlates with 0.569. Variation inflation
factors (VIF) are also investigated for each coefficient in each model (not tabulated), the highest
factor found was for the two factors 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶 𝑥 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 and 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶 𝑥 𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 which both was
close to 4. According to Green (2003) VIF levels could be as high as 20, before being indicative of
any multicollinearity.












Table 5: Full sample 0.0151 0.7124 0.4647 0.0001 1.83e-87
Table 5: Positive NREC sample 0.0022 0.7512 0.1099 0.2752 7.13e-127
APM Motivation:
Table 6: Full sample 0.0468 0.0392 0.3611 0.0002 1.61e-86
Table 6: Positive NREC sample 0.0000 0.0335 0.0975 0.3989 6.12e-126
Debt motivattion:
Table 7: High debt sample 0.0888 0.7085 0.5423 0.0002 1.94e-84
Table 7: Low debt sample 0.2348 0.7036 0.5840 0.0003 5.11e-86
* All values are p-values from the corresponding tests
3.5 External validity
The models used are based upon recent research, which have proven to be generalizable across
the globe. The model for core earnings, shown in Table 1 shows very similar results as the few
who discloses it in their research (McVay , 2006) and (Nagar & Sen, 2016). This proves that
the data material used in this research to calculate core earnings should be good enough in the
further calculations. There are some implications however when it comes to the methods for both
alternative performance measures and debt measurement.
Other studies use search strings and searches after different alternative performance measures in
their research on APM in different settings (see Bhattacharya et al., 2004; Black et al., 2017;
Lougee & Marquardt, 2004). I use a different method where I manually and qualitatively assess
the annual reports of firms, based upon how U.S. SEC (2018) determine if a firm tends to prominate
APM‘s in their financial statements. I quantify this with a dummy variable which equals to 1 if
four or more of the conditions listed in section 3.3 above are met. There might be different ways
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to assess this, and I might be biased when looking through the reports which again could lead me
to wrongly categorize a firm. To estimate an error rate, I once again examine 10% of the firms
who had been classified as APM prominent and I find 0 errors. Additionally the quantitative
requirement of fulfilling four or more of the eight points listed might be set to loose or to strict.
Upon investigating whether or not debt is a motivational factor for firms to engage in classification
shifting, the literature shows that there is not necessarily a yes or no answer to this. There are also
several ways on how to measure debt, and debt levels could be measured against many variables.
Thanh et al. (2020) proves this non-linear relationship against debt and classification shifting and
uses two different debt levels, LDEBT and FDEBT against total assets However, as this research
is from Vietnam it might not be as generalizable into my research context. Both the ratios and the
threshold levels might be different. This is tried to be accounted for with some robustness checks,
see chapter 4.5 in the scientific article.
3.6 Etichal considerations
As a researcher one must always take into consideration potential ethical issues that the research
might rise. This research uses secondary data from databases and official annual reports, no firms
or persons can be separately identified in the final article. Hence, I see no ethical issues that
might occur. The integrity of the research is protected by ensuring anonymity of the companies
researched, while trying to keep the study as transparent as possible. To the best of my knowledge
and based on the available dataset, the findings are honest and truthful. This project is not
reported to the NSD.
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Abstract
This study investigates if firms located in a strong institutional environment, who have an extensive
reporting of alternative performance measures in their financial statement see classification shifting
as a viable earnings management method. As some alternative performance measures are based
upon core earnings, shifting of expenses from recurring to non-recurring items will increase such
alternative measures while remaining net income unchanged. Making it favorable for firms who rely
on pro forma earnings to shift expenses. Contributing to the earnings management literature this
study provides a method for how to classify firms as reliant on pro forma earnings. The results
shows that these firms do see classification shifting as a viable earnings management method
This research also investigates how different debt ratios affects the firms decision to engage in
classification shifting. The findings reveal that firms with high financial debt are more likely to
use expense shifting as a tool rather than firms with low financial debt. The opposite seems to be
valid using a total debt to asset ratio. These results add to the already existing evidence on the
non-linear relationship between debt and the use of classification shifting.
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Structuring a financial report of an entity to achieve a goal that is not achievable by the company‘s
normal business activities, is often referred to as earnings management. In the literature there
are three earnings management methods that are mostly discussed. Accrual earnings management
(Jones, 1991), real earnings management (Roychowdhury, 2006) and classification shifting (McVay,
2006).
Classification shifting is further described as a firm managers decision to intentionally misclassify
different types of revenues or expenses in the income statement to achieve an underlying objective.
More precisely, expense shifting is done by shifting recurring to non-reoccurring items within the
income statement (McVay, 2006). By doing this core earnings will increase, while net income
remains unchanged. Recent literature shows that the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
in 2002, and the mandatory implementation of IFRS has led to a decrease in both accrual based and
real earnings management methods, while classification shifting seems to have increased (Kothari 
et al., 2016; Zalata & Roberts, 2017). However, little research is found in the subject of expense
shifting.
Classification shifting increases core earnings, which some alternative performance measures is
based upon, e.g. earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). In the
later years pro forma earnings have become more extensively used, and its use seems to have a
valuation effect. Additionally, there seems to be bias against reporting of alternative measures that
exceeds regulatory measures, and some firms focuses almost entirely on pro forma earnings when
communicating to investors and analysts (Bhattacharya et al., 2004; Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002;
Doyle et al., 2003). Financial reporting after IFRS opens up for flexibility both through its quali-
tative characteristics and requirements, as well as through managers room for interpretation. The
use of alternative performance measures could affect the reliability, faithfulness and comparability
of the financial statements as they are non-regulated and non-audited. This ultimately creates an
opportunity for companies that reports after IFRS to manage earnings, especially through classi-
fication shifting. Some firms may for example try to take attention away from a poor net income
result by enhancing a better alternative performance measure instead of in their financial reports.
By using classification shifting techniques, one may artificially increase alternative performance
measures that are based upon core earnings while leaving net income unchanged.
I do however find a shortcoming in the earnings management field with regards to how extensive
pro forma earnings reporting affects firms’ decision to engage in classification shifting. The main
objective of this paper is therefore to examine if firms that have an extensive use of alternative
performance measures in their financial statements, see classification shifting as a viable earnings
management method Looking at the use of alternative performance measures as a motivational
factor for classification shifting seems highly relevant as some of the measures, such as EBITDA,
are based directly on core earnings. These are also often wrongly classified, and used with a lot
variety (Mey & Lamprecht, 2020). Ultimately this could lead to a loss of decision usefulness in
the presented figure.
Further, it has been shown that higher leveraged firms are more likely to disclose alternative
performance measures in their financial statements (Lougee & Marquardt, 2004), which makes
regulatory IFRS earnings less informative. The classification shifting literature is mostly focused
on equity markets, and to complete the analysis debt markets should also be included (Zalata
& Roberts, 2017). Therefore, this research also aims towards giving a contribution in this field
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as well. Debt markets are complicated, and there exists a variety of different debt and hybrid
debt instruments. Creditors often put covenants on their loans, which sometimes are based upon
alternative performance measures. Extant studies show that financially distressed firms which are
about to breach such covenants, engage in classification shifting to avoid breaching them (Malikov
et al., 2019; Nagar & Sen, 2016). These studies do however only focus on financially distressed
firms with high debt, or those who are about to breach covenants. Motivated by Thanh et al.
(2020), I make use the threshold levels and debt ratios in this research on my sample. This to
get a broader perspective on how different debt ratios motivate firms to engage in classification
shifting. Finally, I also examine if firms who give prominence to alternative performance measures
in their financial statements are more leveraged than other firms.
I use a Norwegian context mostly because of its strong institutional environment. The institutional
environment of where the firm is located seems to have a profound effect on the firms capital struc-
ture (Fan et al., 2012). Firms located in strong institutional environments have access to longer
term debt, and are often less leveraged than those located in weak institutional environments.
However, this study show that companies located in Norway is among the highest leveraged ones.
Norway is also known for having a relatively strong investor protection environment (Hope et
al., 2009). Highly leveraged firms are more inclined to engage in earnings management meth-
ods according to An et al. (2016), but this relationship is less pronounced for firms located in
countries with a strong institutional environment. This makes Norwegian companies an excellent
environment to investigate these research problems, and could make the research valid in other
environments as well.
The results show that notwithstanding the strong institutional environment provided in Norway,
classification shifting is seen as a viable earnings management method for firms listed on the
Oslo Stock Exchange. Out of the 585 firm years collected, approximately 42% do tend to give
prominence to alternative performance measures. The main findings show compelling evidence
for that these firms alone are more motivated to engage in classification shifting than the whole
sample is. To some extent, the findings do also confirm the non-linear relationship between debt
and classification shifting, as earlier found by both Ghosh & Moon (2010) and Thanh et al. (2020).
Firms with high financial debt seems to engage in classification shifting to a greater extent than
firms with low financial debt. The opposite seems to be valid when testing the sample on total
debt ratio. I do however not find any conclusive results on the notion that firms who have an
extensive use of alternative performance measures in their financial statements, are either more or
less leveraged than other firms are.
This study makes several contributions to the earnings management literature. First, it adds to
the understanding that the principle based IFRS sets an arena that enables classification shifting,
even for firms located in a strong institutional environment. This should be taken into account in
the costs and benefit discussion of IFRS. Second, it introduces a method for how to differentiate
firms who rely alternative performance measures and those who don‘t. The results do confirm that
these firms are more willing to engage in classification shifting. Third, as there is little research
on how debt ratios and their threshold levels affects managers decision to engage in classification
shifting in a European context, this research provide some insight on this as well.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the relevant literature and
the hypothesis development. Section 3 provides the method used. Section 4 contains the empirical
results and robustness checks, while section 5 contains the conclusion.
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2.0 Literature review
2.1 Classification shifting of expenses
In the later years there seem to be a shift in managers preference when it comes choice of earnings
management methods. Before the introduction of IFRS firms seemed to make use of accrual-based
and real earnings management methods, but in the later years’ classification shifting have become
the more preferred method.
Classification shifting of expenses occurs when managers inflate their core earnings by shifting
expenses from recurring to non-recurring items. McVay (2006) provides the first evidence of clas-
sification shifting with her changes model. She finds that some managers in the United States in-
creases the firms core earnings by shifting expenses from operating expenses, to income-decreasing
special items. Through a two-stage model one first finds a firms expected core earnings, and then
compares this to the firms reported core earnings to find the unexpected core earnings. Later
this model was modified by Fan et al. (2010) who studies classification shifting tendencies at a
quarterly basis, and find that classification shifting is more likely to be done by managers in the
fourth quarter. This modified model was also used by Zalata & Roberts (2017) in their study of
classification shifting in the UK. In their examination of the post-IFRS era, they find that the
introduction of IFRS actually decreases the transparency intended by IFRS with regards to dis-
closure of non-recurring items in the financial statements. Managerial judgement demanded by
IFRS facilitates for opportunistic accounting, which again enables classification shifting. This is
also supported by Malikov et al. (2018).
Athanasakou et al. (2009) finds evidence for that classification shifting is used to meet and beat
analyst expectations, but no evidence for the use of accrual-based methods in the same context.
However, Doukakis (2014) finds no supporting evidence for that the level of real and accrual earn-
ings management have decreased after the implementation of IFRS. Classification shifting have
the benefit on lower cost for those who uses it, compared to accrual and real earnings management
methods. Accruals reverse in the later periods, while real earnings management ends up with for-
gone returns and increased cost. Since classification shifting methods leaves net income unchanged,
it is less detectable by auditors, users and regulators. Furthermore, as financial constraints might
prevent firms from engaging in real earnings management activities, Abernathy et al. (2014) finds
that such activities are not a hinder for firms engagement in classification shifting. In sum this
points towards that classification shifting might be used as a substitution for these techniques.
Studies shows that core earnings are considered more informative than regulatory net income,
and for valuation purposes core earnings are often favored by investors. Modified versions of non-
GAAP earnings are both preferred and weighted higher than audited GAAP earnings according to
both Bradshaw & Sloan (2002) and Bhattacharya et al. (2004). This is supported by Doyle et al.
(2003), who also finds that companies that report pro forma earnings often exclude non-recurring
expenses in their financial statements. This fools the market as they do not see through this, and
values the company higher than it would if these were included. In addition, Doyle et al. (2013)
evidence points towards that managers opportunistically define non-GAAP earnings to meet or
beat analyst expectations by excluding expenses from these.
This seems to be exploited by firms as Mey & Lamprecht (2020) finds that companies inconsis-
tently define, labels and calculates EBITDA. Of the 220 companies investigated, 24% of these who
reports a clean EBITDA are actually found to be calculated with adjustment other than ITDA-
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adjustments. They also identify over 50 different labels on EBITDA in the financial statements of
the examined companies. The conclusions is that EBITDA is not faithfully represented, because
the reported EBITDA figure lacks decision usefulness. A second problem with such measures is
that very often they are not explained by the firms who uses it, which can lead to confusion or
miscalculations. Often pro forma measures are disclosed without giving any information about
how it is calculated, or which adjustments that is added to the measure. Non-IFRS earnings may
be attractive to report for some firms because they are not required to be audited, which gives
managers the option to present the firms “core earnings” in a way which suits the certain firm
best.
Different alternative performance measures can be presented by companies because mandatory
performance measures does not fit the specific company very good. Another reason might be
that they want to try to disguise a poorer underlying result. The above-mentioned studies have
shown that this might be an effective way to mislead investors, as they seem to valuate core
earnings higher than net income. Shifting of recurring items to non-recurring items will increase
the alternative performance measure that are based upon core earnings, while leaving net income
unchanged. Thus, an extensive use of alternative performance measures in a firms financial report
might be an indication that the company utilizes classification shifting.
Even though it seems that EBITDA has rather low decision usefulness, it is still used as a covenant
in some debt contracts. Companies that is imposed with this type of covenant do manage earnings
not to breach them (Malikov et al., 2019; Roychowdhury, 2006). Zalata & Roberts (2017) also
points out that since higher earnings today in an analyst or creditor context means higher earnings
in the future, thus there is less risk for default. Less risk for default means less credit risk and
lower interest rates for the firm. This points towards that high debt levels might be a motivational
factor for firms managers to engage in earnings management techniques. Financially distressed
companies are according to Nagar & Sen (2016) more likely to value pro forma earnings, and more
likely to report special items in their financial statement. They also find evidence for that these
companies also engage in classification shifting. Lougee & Marquardt (2004) point at a connection
in their study about earnings informativeness, that firms who reports pro forma earnings are higher
leveraged than firms who don‘t. In addition, they also provide evidence for that these firms also
have significantly more negative special items, or income-decreasing items. According to Laurion
(2020) firms that reports non-GAAP earnings pursue more and engage in larger acquisitions. This
leads to higher CAPEX and higher debt levels. As it is fairly difficult to detect classification
shifting techniques, firms that seek debt financing are according to Nagar & Sen (2016) are more
likely to make use of such methods. However, Kim et al. (2021) finds that firms who do engage
in earnings management, and are detected by credit institutions most likely are penalized by the
banks by imposing tighter covenants and higher interest rates.
Earnings quality of firms with high debt levels seems to reach a breaking point when firms reaches
a debt ratio of approximately 41%. With lower debt levels earnings quality of firms increases, as
credit facilities demand high quality earnings to assess the firms creditworthiness. Firms are eager
to provide this, as it will give them a lower cost of debt. However, at higher debt levels the debt
covenants becomes stricter and the firm may have to decide upon delivering high quality earnings
or breaching debt covenants (Ghosh & Moon, 2010). Zhang et al. (2020) however argues that
equity financing is more vulnerable to information asymmetry (see Jensen & Meckling, 1976) than
debt financing. Even though they find evidence for that debt financing do motivate the use of
earnings management, equity financing motivates firms to a greater extent.
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Thanh et al. (2020) indicates a similar non-linear relationship between debt and earnings manage-
ment as Ghosh & Moon (2010) did. Their study seems to be more accurate in the way that they
do include debt-earnings management coefficients which indicates different variants to both firm
and time when the threshold variable moves from low to high regime. They also point towards
that higher debt does not motivate earnings management up to a certain threshold. Beyond that
threshold however, managers are motivated to engage in earnings management due to higher fi-
nancial distress cost. Their evidence points towards that managers are more willing to engage in
earnings management techniques when total liabilities to total assets exceed approximately 60%
and when total financial debt to total assets exceeds approximately 33%.
Both capital structure and the motivation to engage in earnings management are influenced by the
institutional environment in the country where the firm is located. Fan et al. (2012) shows that
firms located in countries with strong institutional environments rely more on long-term debt, but
are less reliant on debt financing in total. At the same time their research do reveal that Norway
is one of the highest leveraged countries, despite its strong institutional environment. An et al.
(2016) studies 25 777 firms in 37 countries over two decades and concludes that higher leveraged
firms are more motivated to engage in earnings management. They also concluded with that
this relationship seem to be less pronounced in firms which are based in countries with stronger
institutionalized environments.
2.2 Hypothesis development
Investors seems to prefer and value non-IFRS earnings higher than regulatory net income accord-
ing to Bradshaw & Sloan (2002) and Bhattacharya et al. (2004). One way for the company to
achieve higher valuation could be by artificially increase their alternative performance measures,
and afterwards give them more prominence than regulatory IFRS measures in their financial state-
ments. By misclassification of recurring items as non-recurring items core earnings will increase,
and at the same time this will result in both a higher unexpected core earnings and non-recurring
items. The net income will remain unaffected and alternative performance measures that are
based upon core earnings, such as EBITDA will increase. Firms often include adjusted measures
such as X-EBITDA in their financial reports and defend this use as a better provision for their
future prospects. However, as Mey & Lamprecht (2020) finds that measures such as EBITDA
lacks decision usefulness, extensive use of pro forma measures can easily mislead investors, causing
higher valuation of the firm (Doyle et al., 2003). Additionally, Black et al. (2017) finds that firms
are more inclined to give prominence to non-GAAP earnings after they have engaged in earnings
management techniques if they fall short of analyst expectations.
Classification shifting have in the later years become more widely used, and acts as a substitute
for real and accrual earnings management. Furthermore, classification shifting is a better tool if
the managers wants to increase core earnings as it is a easy do to, comes without a cost, and its
use is hard for users and auditors to detect.
In sum, ceteris paribus firms who give more prominence to alternative performance measures than
to regulatory IFRS measures in their financial statement are expected to misclassify recurring
expenses as non-recurring expenses.
This leads to the first hypothesis:
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H1: Firms who give prominence to alternative performance measures in their financial statements,
are likely to engage in classification shifting of expenses.
Firms who give prominence to alternative performance measures have higher CAPEX and are more
likely to have higher debt levels, since they according to Laurion (2020) pursue more and makes
larger acquisitions. Debt as a motivational factor for firms engagement in earnings management is
however not so widely discussed as equity markets are. The research show that the conclusions is
rather indecisive as both Ghosh & Moon (2010) and Thanh et al. (2020) finds that there is a non-
linear relationship between debt and earnings management. They argue that firms with high debt,
but not so much debt that they are financially distressed or about to breach any debt covenants
are not motivated to engage in earnings management at the cost of lower earnings quality. These
firms are under scrutiny by the creditors who will penalize the firms who engages in earnings
management with higher interest rates, or tighter covenants if detected (Kim et al., 2021). This
makes the motivation to commence in earnings management low for such firms. On the other side,
if these firms are financially distressed because of their high debt levels or about to breach any
debt covenants, firms might shift expenses to portray a better picture or to avoid breaching any
covenants. Higher debt will in most cases increase interest rates payments for a firm. A company
with higher interest-bearing debt will have a lower net income than a similar company, ceteris
paribus. Shifting expenses to increase other performance measures might take the users of the
financial statement attention away from a poor net income result. Financially distressed firms are
likely to use expense shifting according to Nagar & Sen (2016), since the alternative cost as to not
engage in classification shifting is much higher.
This leads to the second hypothesis:
H2: Firms with high debt levels are likely to engage in classifications shifting of expenses.
Looking at firms that have low debt levels the opposite seems true. Firms with little or no debt are
more motivated to achieve higher earnings quality than to engage in earnings management, since
the risk of a covenant breach is rather low or non-existent. Additionally, delivering high quality
earnings might lead to lower interest rates and better loan terms (Ghosh & Moon, 2010). Lower
debt levels imply more equity financing, and atomistic shareholders don‘t have the incentives to
monitor managers. This because the cost is higher than the benifit it gives. According to Zhang
et al. (2020), firms who seek external financing are more likely to engage in earnings management
if seeking equity financing rather than debt financing. This is consistent with Teoh et al. (1998)
who finds that firms planning an IPO have higher discretionary accruals than firms who are not
intending one. In the later years this is supported by Liu & Wu (2020) who finds that in the
pre-IPO period expenses are more likely to be shifted. The two conflicting perspectives on how
low debt levels motivate managers to engage in classification shifting, is ultimately determined by
the interactions between these two.
This leads to the third hypothesis:
H3: Firms with low debt levels are likely to engage in classifications shifting of expenses.
Reporting after IFRS demands managerial judgment (IFRS, 2018), in addition it allows for the use
of non-regulated, and non-audited alternative performance measures. Mey & Lamprecht (2020)
proves that alternative performance measures are used in a wide variety and some companies that
evidentially claim they presents a clean EBITDA, while it is actually an adjusted number. TThe
Financial Supervision Authority of Norway (2017) has through a survey proven that Norwegian
firms do rely extensively on alternative performance measures, and very often these are not ex-
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plained by the company either. This could lead to confusion about how the number is calculated,
and thus confirms some of Mey & Lamprecht (2020) results.
As the aforementioned discussion shows there might be a connection between classification shifting
and alternative performance measures, as well as classification shifting and debt levels. According
to Lougee & Marquardt (2004) firms that reports pro forma earnings more often than not have
higher debt levels. In other words, firms that are highly leveraged may have an incentive to use
more alternative performance measures to conceal poor IFRS measures, and give more attention
to the alternative measures which could be altered through classification shifting techniques.
This leads to the fourth hypothesis:
H4: Firms that give prominence to alternative performance measures in their financial statements
are more leveraged firms who don‘t .
3.0 Research design
3.1 Sample selection and data sources
The sample consist of Norwegian firms that are continuously listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange in
the period 2014 to 2019. The analysis period is between 2015 - 2019, but as some of the variables
are lagged it requires data from 201412. The total sample consist of 117 firms that in total adds up
to 585 firm years, and is collected through the Proff Forvalt database. In line with other similar
studies the financial and utilities sector are not included as a part of this study (Fan et al., 2010;
McVay, 2006; Nagar & Sen, 2016; Zalata & Roberts, 2017). All sectors included have more than six
firm-year observations included (Athanasakou et al., 2009). I use the global industry classification
standard (GCIS) for classifying industries, and due to the low number of firms available in the
telecom sector it has been merged with the IT sector. Since sales is used as a scalar in most of the
variables, firms with less than NOK 10 mill. in revenues are excluded as well. All variables are
winsorized at the 1% and 99%.
Table 1: Sample selction
Number of firms Firm years
Total available firms / firm years 289 1445
Less financial and utilities sector 55 275
Less firms with revenue lower than NOK 10 million 6 30
Less firms with missing financial data, and foregin firms 70 350
Less firms that are not listed throughout the whole period 41 205
Final sample 117 585
Data for if firms tend to prominate alternative performance measures (APM) are collected manually
through the firms annual reports in the sample period. From the total sample, I find that 243 out
1Firms listed on Oslo Axess are also included.
2This is to ensure that firms report after IFRS, as it is mandatory to report after IFRS to be listed on the stock
exchange.
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of 585 (41.54%) firm year observations tend to give more prominence to non-IFRS measures than
to regulatory IFRS measures in their financial statements.
Table 2: Alternative performance measures (APM)
Firm years
Number of annual reports where APM‘s are given more prominence than IFRS measures 243
Number of annual reports where APM‘s are not given more prominence than IFRS measures 342
Total sample 585
3.2 Models
Managers that engage in classification shifting aims to shift either revenues or expenses3 to increase
core earnings. Core earnings are those earnings that is connected to the normal operations of a
firm and are expected to reoccur every year, in other words it is net income added non-recurring
expenses and special items. Non-recurring and special items will be those who are infrequent, or
unusual in a firms normal operation. Examples of these can be write-offs, research and development
cost, goodwill impairment etc.
The methodology used in this paper follows Zalata & Roberts (2017) on measuring classification
shifting of expenses. Zalata & Roberts (2017) builds on McVay (2006), who first found evidence
of misclassification of non-recurring expenses as recurring expenses through her changes model.
McVay (2006) models the expected core earnings of a firm with relation to other performance
measures, and is estimated for firm i in year t. She found that core earnings could be estimated
through the firms previous period core earnings, asset turnover, this period and previous period
accruals and the change in sales. Zalata & Roberts (2017) however does not make use of current
period accruals as Fan et al. (2010) recommends this exclusion. Including current period accruals
may lead to a mechanically positive relationship between non-recurring items and unexpected core
earnings and should therefore be omitted. Based upon this the model used for finding estimated
core earnings is as follows, estimated by industry and fiscal year:
𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑇 𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4Δ𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5Δ𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (1)
As the dependent variable reported core earnings scaled by sales, (𝐶𝐸) is used for firm i in year
t. Core earnings is net income added tax expenses, interest expenses, depreciation, amortization
and impairments. As core earnings is expected to be fairly stable, lagged core earnings is used
as the first explanatory variable (𝐶𝐸𝑡−1). 𝐴𝑇 𝑂 is the asset turnover ratio, which is net sales
divided by average net operating assets. Net operating assets are operating assets less operating
liabilities. It is included because companies will always attempt to utilize assets efficiently and
therefore maximize the return on assets, hence there will be a inverse relationship between asset
turnover and profit margin. Total operating lagged accruals (𝑇 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡−1) is found by subtracting
lagged operating cash flow from operations from lagged net income scaled by lagged sales. Since
future performance is related to past accruals, this will capture the information content of last
3This study do only look at classification shifting of expenses.
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period accruals for current period earnings. As previously mentioned, contemporaneous accruals
can create a mechanically positive relationship between non-recurring items and unexpected core
earnings, therefore they are excluded from this model (Fan et al., 2010). Δ𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 is the net
percentage change in net sales, and is included to capture the impact that sales growth has on
fixed costs. Δ𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 are the same as Δ𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 if this figure is negative. It is included to adjust
for any un-utilized resources that still exists within the firm in case of falling levels of activity. If
sales growth is positive Δ𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 is used while Δ𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 is 0, and opposite.
The difference in reported core earnings and expected core earnings will be unexpected core earn-
ings (𝑈𝐶𝐸). Model (1) is used to calculate the expected core earnings for firm i in year t. In
line with Zalata & Roberts (2017), I then use model (2) to find evidence for misclassification of
recurring expenses as non-recurring expenses.
𝑈𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (2)
Non-recurring items (𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶) is calculated as the reported core earnings less net income, scaled
by sales. Income-decreasing items will be positive, while income-increasing items will be negative
and are similar to Zalata & Roberts (2017) set to 0.
Control variables are added to the model, and these are meant to capture firm characteristics
which can affect the level of earnings management. Size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) is the natural log of total assets.
Leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉 ) is long term debt scaled by equity. Operating cash flow (𝑂𝐶𝐹 ) is cash flow from
operations scaled by lagged total assets. Return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴) is net income divided by lagged
total assets. Market to book value (𝑀𝐵𝑉 ) is the market value of the firm (measured at year end),
divided by book value of equity.
To investigate if Norwegian firms that give alternative performance measures (APM) more promi-
nence over IFRS measures in their financial statements tries to increase core earnings through
misclassification of expenses, I modify model (2). By adding the variable 𝐴𝑃𝑀 and its interaction
with 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶, I get model (3).
𝑈𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (3)
I this model, APM (alternative performance measure) is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if four
or more of the following conditions are met, and 0 otherwise4. This data is manually collected
through the firms annual reports.
• Presentation of a full separate income statement containing only non-IFRS measures within
the annual report.
• Presentation of non-IFRS measures within the first ten pages of the annual report, without
presenting IFRS measures within these first ten pages.
4These are qualitative measures stated by the U.S. SEC (2018) in which they rely on to evaluate if non-GAAP
measures are given more prominence than regulatory GAAP measures.
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• A heading or a caption in the annual report that includes non-IFRS measures, but does not
include a comparable IFRS measure.
• Presenting a non-IFRS measure using a presentation style that emphasizes the non-IFRS
measure over the comparable IFRS measure, if a comparable measure is mentioned.
• A IFRS measure that is followed directly by non-IFRS measure anywhere in the annual
report.
• Describing in any way a non-IFRS measure as exceptional (or any other synonym), without
equally describing a comparable IFRS measure.
• Presenting non-IFRS measures in a tabular format, without including comparable IFRS
measure in the same or another table.
• Discussing or analyzing a non-IFRS measure, without having a similar discussion or analysis
of a comparable IFRS measure with equal or greater prominence.
This approach is a modification as of the approach used by Bhattacharya et al. (2004), Lougee
& Marquardt (2004), Black et al. (2017) and Laurion (2020) who uses different pro forma search
strings both to identify firms non-GAAP practices, and to classify them as non-GAAP firms.
Differentiating firms who rely on alternative performance measures with this method is more
thorough than the aforementioned ones. It could also provide new insight on how to identify and
classify firms who have an extensive use of alternative performance measures in their financial
statements.
To control for classification shifting and debt, I follow Thanh et al. (2020) who finds that firms are
more willing to engage in earnings management if the total liabilities to assets exceed approximately
60%, and if the total financial debt to total assets exceed approximately 33%. The two explanatory
variables used are respectively 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 and 𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 .
𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 is calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. 𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 includes only the
financial debt or interest bearing debt, and is calculated as long term debt + current portion debt
+ notes payable divided by total assets.
𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 = 𝑇 𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑇 𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 = 𝑇 𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇 𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
If LDEBT and FDEBT is higher than 60% and 33% of total assets respectively it is set to 1, and
0 otherwise. Adding the control variables 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 , 𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 and their interactions with 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶
to model (2) I get model (4).
𝑈𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡, 𝑥 𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 (4)
+ 𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑀𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
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As the literature indicates that there is a non-linear relationship between debt levels and earnings
management model (4) is run again, but this time with LDEBT and FDEBT set to 1 if the debt
levels are lower than 60% and 33%, otherwise they are set to 0.
4. Empirical results
4.1 Descriptive statistics.
The main variables used in this analysis is shown in Table 3 below. The mean (median) core
earnings as a percentage of sales is 7.53 % (11.02 %). The mean (median) unexpected core earnings
is 0 % (-1.203 %). This is expected as they are residuals from model (1). These results are also
similar to both what Zalata & Roberts (2017) and Athanasakou et al. (2009) finds.
The non-recurring items (𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶) as percentage of sales have a mean (median) of 19.4 % (8.44
%), which is quite high compared to what other studies finds. Zalata & Roberts (2017) and
Athanasakou et al. (2009) finds non-recurring items af 6,1% and 2,1% respectively. In the period
2000 - 2015 Eilifsen & Knivsflå (2021) finds special items on average to be 6,1% of sales in Norwe-
gian companies. Looking at Table 4 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶 correlates positively (significant at the 1% level) with
𝑈𝐶𝐸. This is expected since an increase in the unexpected core earnings can come as a result
of shifting of expenses from recurring to non-recurring items, which is represented by 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶.
Multicollinearity issues can occur with highly correlated variables, which do not seem to be an
issue here.
On average 41.54% of the firms have a tendency to give prominence to APM´s in their annual
reports. 46.5% of the firms have total liabilities that exceed 60% of total assets, and 69.91% have
financial debt that exceed 33% of total assets. This confirms some of Fan et al. (2012) evidence,
and shows that Norwegian firms to a great extent rely on debt to finance their activities.
Table 3: Summary statistics.
Descriptive statistics for the full sample
Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean 25th Median 75th Std. Dev.
Model (1):
CE 0.0753 0.0385 0.1102 0.2265 0.446
CE𝑡−1 0.0567 0.0382 0.1080 0.2196 0.492
ATO 0.8303 0.2885 0.7175 1.1870 0.635
TACC𝑡−1 -0.1916 -0.2273 -0.0490 -0.0022 0.436
ΔSales 0.1704 0.0000 0.0670 0.2051 0.254
ΔNEGSales -0.0632 -0.0491 0.0000 0.0000 0.129
Model (3 and 4):
UCE 0.0000 -0.0520 -0.0120 0.0612 0.213
NREC 0.1940 0.0405 0.0844 0.2233 0.260
APM 0.4154 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.493
LDEBT 0.4650 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.499
FDEBT 0.6991 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.459
SIZE 14.4244 12.6709 14.3128 15.9126 1.984
LEV 0.7872 0.1186 0.4776 1.0776 0.901
OCF 0.0665 0.0094 0.0628 0.1252 0.124
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ROA -0.0005 -0.0496 0.0283 0.0801 0.150
MBV 4.8408 1.0000 2.1332 5.4962 6.424
Note:
CE is core earnings, and measured as net income added tax expenses, interest expenses, depreciation, amortization and impairments.
CE𝑡−1 is previous years core earnings.
ATO is asset turn over ratio, measured as net sales divided by average net operating assets.
TACC𝑡−1 is total operating lagged accruals, found by subtracting lagged operating cash flow from operations from lagged net income.
ΔSales is the net percentage change in net sales.
ΔNEGSales is the net percentage change in net sales when sales is negative.
UCE is the unexpected core earnings, measured as reported core earnings less CE.
NREC is non-recurring expenses, and measured as the difference between reported core earnings and bottom line net income scaled by sales.
APM is a dummy variable set to 1 if four or more of the conditions in section 3.2 are met, and 0 otherwise.
LDEBT is a dummy variable set to 1 if total liabilities divided by total assets exceeds / is lower than 60%
LDEBT is a dummy variable set to 1 if total debt divided by total assets exceeds / is lower than 33%
SIZE is the size of the firm, measured as the natural log of total assets.
LEV is leverage, measured as long term debt scaled by equity.
OCF is operating cash flow, measured as cash flow from operations scaled by lagged total assets.
ROA is the return on assets, measured as net income divided by lagged total assets.
MBV is the market to book value, measured as the market value of the firm at year end divided by book value of equity.
Table 4: Spearman correlation table
UCE NREC APM LDEBT FDEBT SIZE LEV CFO ROA MBV
UCE 1
NREC .2448*** 1
APM .0013 -.0705 1
LDEBT .0813* .0744 -.0694 1
FDEBT .0254 -.0608 .0084 .4546*** 1
SIZE .0894* .0739 .1115** .0587 .1375*** 1
LEV .1308** .2295*** -.0408 .4818*** .3428*** .4349*** 1
CFO .1424*** -.0782 .1396*** .1137** .1269** .2171*** .1723*** 1
ROA .2545*** -.3669*** .1226** -.0762 .0373 .2339*** .0869* .5689*** 1
MBV -.0241 -.0856* .1117** .0662 -.0893* -.3103*** -.0101 .1955*** .2171*** 1
Note:
* Indicate signifigance at 10% in a two-tailed test
** Indicate signifigance at 5% in a two-tailed test
*** Indicate signifigance at 1% in a two-tailed test
Variable definitions are given in Table 3
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4.2 Classification shifting evidence
Model (2) is run first to examine for evidence of classification shifting on the full sample. The
results from this model will reveal if firms listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange see classification
shifting as a viable earnings management method. Two regressions are run, one on the full sample
and one with only those who have 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶 expenses. Firms with 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶 expenses are according to
Zalata & Roberts (2017) more viable to engage in expense shifting. To further test the hypotheses
the interactions between APM and non-recurring items, as well as debt and non-recurring items
are tested separately later, this to avoid multicollinearity issues.
Table 5: Evidence of classification shifting
Dependent variable:
UCE
Full sample Firms with NREC expenses
(1) (2)
NREC 0.132∗∗∗ (0.042) 0.104∗∗∗ (0.039)
t = 3.180 t = 2.690
SIZE −0.005 (0.006) −0.007 (0.005)
t = −0.948 t = −1.430
LEV 0.010 (0.010) 0.007 (0.010)
t = 1.000 t = 0.763
CFO −0.066 (0.093) −0.064 (0.088)
t = −0.707 t = −0.725
ROA 0.525∗∗∗ (0.082) 0.479∗∗∗ (0.081)
t = 6.400 t = 5.940
MBV −0.001 (0.001) −0.002 (0.001)
t = −0.830 t = −1.400
Constant 0.084 0.133
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Observations 585 533
R2 0.126 0.124
Adjusted R2 0.100 0.095
F Statistic 6.280∗∗∗ (df = 13; 567) 5.590∗∗∗ (df = 13; 515)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors are given in in parantheses.
The parameters are estimated based on the following model:
𝑈𝐶𝐸i,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶i,t + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸i,t + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉 i,t + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑂i,t
+𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴i,t + 𝛽6𝑀𝐵𝑉 i,t + 𝜖i,t
Variable definitions are given in Table 3
From Table 5 one can see that the coefficient for 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶 is positive and significant at the 1% for
the full sample regression. This indicates that firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange do see
classification shifting of expenses as a viable method for increasing their core earnings. For the
smaller sample the coefficient for 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶 is also positive and significant at the 1%, but smaller.
First of all, this provides evidence for that even in a strong institutional environment as Norway
provides, classification shifting still occurs. Second it is an addition to the already existing evidence,
that the managerial opportunities provided by IFRS opens for classification shifting. Third it acts
as a cautionary tale for users and auditors of the financial statements, as classification shifting
artificially increases core earnings while leaving net income unchanged making it difficult to detect.
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Core earnings are often used as a proxy for cash-flow and are often considered more informative
than regulatory net-income (Bhattacharya et al., 2004; Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002), thus artificially
increasing the measure could mislead users, auditors and regulators. Credit facilities who base
their covenants on core earnings (Malikov et al., 2019) should be especially careful since firms
could use expense shifting to avoid breaching their covenants.
Further, the coefficient for 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is slightly negative portraying that larger size firms are less
likely to engage in classification shifting, however it is not significant so the evidence for this is at
the best modest. The positive and significant at the 1% coefficient for 𝑅𝑂𝐴 indicates that firms
with higher returns on their assets are more likely to use classification shifting. 𝐿𝐸𝑉 is positive
providing evidence for that higher leveraged firms are more likely to use classification shifting,
however since the coefficient is not significant the evidence here also is quite limited.
4.3 The effect of APM reporting on classification shifting
To test the first hypothesis if firms that give more prominence to alternative performance measures
utilizes expense shifting, I run regression (3) on both the full sample and only on those with 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶
expenses. A firm is classified as APM prominent four or more of the eight criteria stated in section
3.2 are fulfilled. In Table 6 below, the coefficient of interest is 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶 𝑥 𝐴𝑃𝑀 . A positive and
significant coefficient is expected for hypothesis one to be true.
In both the full sample and the smaller sample with only firms that have non-recurring expenses,
the coefficient for 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶 𝑥 𝐴𝑃𝑀 is positive and significant at the 1%. These results provide
evidence for that companies who give more prominence to alternative performance measures in
their financial reports, see classification shifting as viable a tool to increase their core earnings.
This coefficient is greater than the coefficient for 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶 in Table 5, providing evidence for that
these firms alone are more motivated to engage in classification shifting than the whole sample
is. Firms that have an extensive reporting of alternative performance measures in their financial
reports, might want to enhance these. One way to do this is through expense shifting, which comes
both with little cost and is not easily detectable. Shifting expenses increases core earnings and the
alternative performance measures that are based upon core earnings. This is supported by Lougee
& Marquardt (2004) who finds that firms reporting pro forma earnings are significantly more likely
to report income-decreasing items than firms who does not report pro forma earnings. This is also
consistent with Nagar & Sen (2016) who argues that firms who value pro forma earnings are more
likely to report special items, which again increases the opportunity for these firms to engage in
classification shifting.
As a significant portion of the variation in unexpected core earnings can be explained by the inter-
action of the APM dummy variable and non-recurring expenses, this might also be an indication
that the quality of the financial reports of these firms are low as well. Mey & Lamprecht (2020)
research find strong evidence for that EBTIDA, which is a pro forma earning based on core earn-
ings lacks decision usefulness. This could fool investors, leading to a higher valuation of the firm
if not detected.
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Table 6: The effect of APM reporting on classification shifting
Dependent variable:
UCE
Full sample Firms with NREC expenses
(1) (2)
NREC 0.075∗ (0.044) 0.055 (0.041)
t = 1.690 t = 1.330
APM −0.064∗∗∗ (0.024) −0.053∗∗ (0.023)
t = −2.640 t = −2.250
APM x NREC 0.367∗∗∗ (0.116) 0.336∗∗∗ (0.105)
t = 3.170 t = 3.180
SIZE −0.004 (0.005) −0.005 (0.005)
t = −0.678 t = −1.080
LEV 0.003 (0.011) 0.001 (0.010)
t = 0.300 t = 0.084
CFO −0.109 (0.094) −0.099 (0.089)
t = −1.170 t = −1.120
ROA 0.554∗∗∗ (0.082) 0.492∗∗∗ (0.081)
t = 6.740 t = 6.110
MBV −0.001 (0.001) −0.002 (0.001)
t = −0.940 t = −1.550
Constant 0.083 0.119
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Observations 585 533
R2 0.141 0.140
Adjusted R2 0.113 0.108
F Statistic 6.210∗∗∗ (df = 15; 565) 5.560∗∗∗ (df = 15; 513)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors are given in in parantheses.
The parameters are estimated based on the following model:
𝑈𝐶𝐸i,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶i,t + 𝛽2𝐴𝑃𝑀i,t + 𝛽3𝐴𝑃𝑀i,t𝑥𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶i,t
+𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸i,t + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉 i,t + 𝛽6𝐶𝐹𝑂i,t + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴i,t + 𝛽8𝑀𝐵𝑉 i,t + 𝜖i,t
Variable definitions are given in Table 3
4.4 The effect of debt on classification shifting and APM reporting
As there seems to be a connection between the reporting of alternative performance measures and
highly leveraged firms (Lougee & Marquardt, 2004), debt levels and their interaction on unexpected
core earnings and non-recurring expenses are examined as well. The literature is twofold when it
comes to earnings management and debt levels. Therefore, I examine firms with both high and
low debt levels and their interactions on non-recurring expenses, which will give an answer to
hypothesis two and three.
Firms with high debt levels could be motivated to engage in classification shifting due to their
higher interest expenses than other firms with lower debt. Higher leveraged firms will have a
lower net income due to higher interest expenses, ceteris paribus. To make up for the lower net
income one might be inclined to artificially increase core earnings and try to portray a better result
that way. Additionally, as highly leveraged companies could be on the verge to breach any debt
covenants, classification shifting could be used to avoid a breach. EBITDA-covenants are often
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used (Abernathy et al., 2014; Malikov et al., 2019), and expense shifting could lead to more slack
in the covenant.
On the other side one can argue for that firms with lower debt levels, consequently more equity
financed also are inclined to engage in classification shifting. Investors providing equity financing
are more exposed to information asymmetry (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), hence firms that seek
equity financing are more prone to engage in classification shifting according to both Liu & Wu
(2020) and Zhang et al. (2020).
To set a benchmark for the debt levels, I make use of Thanh et al. (2020) evidence on classification
shifting and debt. They find that firms are more inclined to engage in classification shifting if the
financial debt level exceeds 33% and the total debt level exceeds approximately 60%. The dummy
variable 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 is therefore set to 1 if total liabilities exceed 60% of total assets, and 𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 is
set to 1 if financial liabilities exceed 33% of total assets, otherwise they are set to 0. The regression
in model (4) is then run on the full sample only. For hypothesis two to be true, I expect a positive
and significant coefficient on both 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 𝑥 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶 and 𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 𝑥 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶.
Since the relationship between debt and classification shifting seems to be non-linear. I once again
test the full sample, but this time I set 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 equal to 1 if total liabilities is less than 60% and
FDEBT equal to 1 if the financial debt is less than 33%, otherwise they are set to 0. For hypothesis
three to be true, I expect a positive and significant coefficient on both 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 𝑥 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶 and
𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 𝑥 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶.
The results in Table 7 shows that the coefficient for 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 𝑥 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶 is negative but not
significant for firms with total liabilities exceeding 0,6. Testing firms with total liabilities lower
than 0,6 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 𝑥 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶 is positive and significant at the 10% level. The opposite applies for
the 𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 𝑥 𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶 coefficient. The coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% for firms
having financial debt exceeding 33%, and negative but not significant for firms with financial debt
less than 33%.
These results do to some extent confirm the non-linearity between debt levels and classification
shifting, which also both Ghosh & Moon (2010) and Thanh et al. (2020) finds. The two different
debt measures are opposite of each other both when it comes to sign and significance. High
𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 might not necessarily be an indication of financial distress, and thus these firms might
refrain from expense shifting since they are under scrutiny of the creditors. High 𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 on the
other side might indicate financial distress, since it is interest bearing debt. Classification shifting
could be used to portray a better result through alternative performance measures, or to avoid
breaching any debt covenants. With lower 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 firms might not be under such scrutiny from
creditors as the high 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 firms are. Opportunistic expense shifting could therefore be used
to mislead investors, since they won‘t bear the cost of monitoring the firm thus ending up with a
higher valued firm. Firms with low 𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 are seemingly not motivated to shift expenses. As
they are not under financial pressure they might refrain from classification shifting and instead
deliver higher quality earnings, which might lead to lower interest rates or better loan terms. The
alternative cost for these firms is much higher if discovered than for the high 𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 sample.
These results could be interpreted as for firms with high debt levels, the financial debt is a better
benchmark to use if looking for motivation for expense shifting. Creditors should therefore be
cautious if the financial debt measure is exceeding 33%. As discussed earlier higher financial debt
provides higher interest rates which again could motivate firms to shift expenses and thus report
higher core earnings. Investors on their hand should be more cautious when a firms total liabilities
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to total asset ratio drops below 60%. These firms seem motivated to engage in classification shifting
which could lead to an artificially high valuation of the firm.
Table 7: The effect of debt on classification shifting
Dependent variable:
UCE
Full sample: LDEBT > 0,6 and FDEBT > 0,33 Full sample: LDBET < 0,6 and FDEBT < 0,33
(1) (2)
NREC 0.058 (0.089) 0.111∗∗ (0.056)
𝑡 = 0.657 𝑡 = 2.000
LDEBT 0.005 (0.011) −0.014 (0.027)
𝑡 = 0.428 𝑡 = −0.522
FDEBT −0.047∗ (0.027) 0.030 (0.030)
𝑡 = −1.750 𝑡 = 1.020
LDEBT x NREC −0.112 (0.135) 0.186∗ (0.104)
𝑡 = −0.835 𝑡 = 1.790
FDEBT x NREC 0.229∗∗∗ (0.054) −0.164 (0.115)
𝑡 = 4.270 𝑡 = −1.430
SIZE −0.006 (0.009) −0.005 (0.006)
𝑡 = −0.653 𝑡 = −0.971
LEV 0.015 (0.019) 0.017 (0.012)
𝑡 = 0.821 𝑡 = 1.400
CFO −0.042 (0.098) −0.046 (0.095)
𝑡 = −0.426 𝑡 = −0.488
ROA 0.518∗∗∗ (0.160) 0.524∗∗∗ (0.082)
𝑡 = 3.230 𝑡 = 6.350
MBV −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001)
𝑡 = −0.893 𝑡 = −0.873
Constant 0.117 0.078
Year Fixed Effects 𝑌 𝑒𝑠 𝑌 𝑒𝑠
Industry Fixed Effect 𝑌 𝑒𝑠 𝑌 𝑒𝑠
Observations 585 585
R2 0.136 0.132
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.100
F Statistic (df = 17; 563) 5.200∗∗∗ 5.050∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors are given in in parantheses.
The parameters are estimated based on the following model:
𝑈𝐶𝐸i,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶i,t + 𝛽2𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 i,t + 𝛽3𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 i,t + 𝛽4𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 i,t𝑥𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶i,t
+𝛽5𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 i,t𝑥𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶i,t + 𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸i,t + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉 i,t + 𝛽8𝐶𝐹𝑂i,t + 𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴i,t + 𝛽10𝑀𝐵𝑉 i,t + 𝜖i,t
Variable definitions are given in Table 3
To test the fourth hypothesis, I check the mean and median leverage levels for the sample after
dividing them into those who are classified as APM prominent and non-APM prominent. APM
prominent are those firms who have the 𝐴𝑃𝑀 variable in model (3) set to 1. I test for the actual
FDEBT and LDEBT, as well as for the 𝐿𝐸𝑉 ratio which is used as a control variable in the other
regressions. For hypothesis four to be true, I expect that the APM prominent group on average
have higher debt levels than the other group.
Table 8 shows that firms classified as non-APM prominent actually are slightly more leveraged on
all three debt level measures. Although Lougee & Marquardt (2004) finds the opposite between
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these two factors, they do point out that this evidence is weak. A two-tailed t-test of the means
do however reveal that there is no difference between the means, indicating that they might be
similar. This observation rejects the fourth hypothesis, that firms who tend to give prominence
to alternative performance measures are more leveraged. The relatively small sample size may on
the other side account for this result. Nevertheless, the mean market to book value (𝑀𝐵𝑉 ) of
the APM prominent group is 4.472 compared to the mean non-prominent group of 12.145. One
explanation to this could be that the APM prominent group want to increase their 𝑀𝐵𝑉 by giving
prominence to alternative performance measures in their financial statements. On the other hand,
it could be an indication that investors not are fooled by the firms extensive use of pro forma
measures, and as such are more cautios in their valuation of these firms.
Table 8: Summary statistics of APM reporting and debt
APM prominent firms Non-prominent firms Test of differences
Number of firms: 243 342 585
Mean Median Mean Median T-Test /
Difference
P-value
APM 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ALDEBT 0.5514 0.5435 0.5898 0.5971 -1.9464 0.0521
AFDEBT 0.4610 0.4561 0.4805 0.4786 -0.9642 0.3353
LEV 0.6672 0.4121 1.4840 0.5500 -1.4686 0.1428
SIZE 14.7245 14.6607 14.2207 14.2179
CFO 0.0894 0.0733 0.0326 0.0561
ROA 0.0298 0.0338 -0.0556 0.0119
MBV 4.4720 2.5685 12.1449 1.7189
Note:
ALDETB and AFDEBT are the actual LDEBT and FDEBT, not the dummy variable
All other variables are defined in Table 3
4.5 Robustnes checks
The consumer staples is the industry that by far have the most firms classified as APM prominent,
with 65% of all firms in this being classified as APM prominent. Eliminating consumer staples
from model (3) would act as a test for if it is this industry alone that drives the relationship
between APM and NREC. Running the regression shows a smaller but still significant at the 1%
coefficient, providing robustness for that the main findings in hypothesis one are conclusive.
The findings shows that high financial debt could be an indication for firms motivation to engage
in classification shifting. At the same time a low total debt ratio could also be an indication for
the firms motivation. The debt regimes on 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 and 𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 from Thanh et al. (2020) could
be quite arbitrary in this setting. To check for this, I test every 10th percentile on 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 and
𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 and find the breaking point on 𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 to be approximately on 30%, very similar to
Thanh et al. (2020) results. The 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 however does not show any clear breaking point. In
addition to avoid eventually multicollinearity issues, the original model (4) is run again but with
𝐿𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 and 𝐹𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 on separate regressions providing similar results.
As the results fail to accept the fourth hypothesis, I also test if firms who are classified as APM-
prominent in yeart-1 and yeart+1 are higher leveraged but the results here are also inconclusive,
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and shows no difference in debt levels between APM prominent firms and non-APM prominent
firms.
5.0 Conclusion
The managerial judgement provided by IFRS opens up for reporting of non-recurring items (Zalata
& Roberts, 2017), as well as the reporting of non-regulated and non-audited alternative perfor-
mance measures in the financial statements. This study investigates whether or not firms who
tend to give prominence to alternative performance measures in their financial statements, see
classification shifting as a viable earnings management method. Past studies show that investors
prefer and value alternative performance measures higher than regulatory measures (Bradshaw &
Sloan, 2002), and by artificially increasing core earnings firms might mislead users of the financial
statement. Furthermore, this study also examines different debt ratios and how these affects firms
decisions to use classification shifting as a earnings management method. As past studies show
a connection between leverage and pro forma reporting (Lougee & Marquardt, 2004), this study
also investigates if there is a relationship between these two factors as well.
The results in this research provides multiple contributions to the literature on classification shifting
of expenses. First of all, the evidence points towards that the firms in this sample, which are
located in a strong institutional environment are inclined to use classification shifting as an earnings
management method. This adds to the already existing literature on the fact that firms who report
after IFRS utilizes classification shifting. Further as the investor protection is strong in Norway
(Hope et al., 2009), it confirms the notion that this method is difficult for users of the financial
statements to detect. As classification shifting is seen as a viable tool in this context, it might be
transferable to other regions with weaker institutional environments.
Second, the main findings of this research reveal that firms who tend to give prominence to al-
ternative performance measures in their financial statements shift expenses to a greater extent
than when testing the whole sample. This should act as a cautionary tale for the users of these
financial statements. Enhancing alternative performance measures by using classification shifting,
and presenting these in the financial statements could lead to an artificial high valuation of the
company. Further as creditors often rely on covenants based upon pro forma earnings, they should
be aware that firms can use classification shifting to avoid a covenant breach. Extensive use of
alternative performance measures in the financial statement might be a indication that the firm
utilizes classification shifting. For standard setters this might also be a caveat for if they should
try to regulate, or standardize the use of such pro forma measures. If alternative performance
measures are standardized this would most likely make the presented figure faithful and compara-
ble, which again would make it a decision useful measure. In addition, this might remove one of
the incentives firm managers apparently have to engage in classification shifting.
Third it ads to the already existing literature on the non-linear relationship between debt and
earnings management. The evidence points towards that if firms have high financial, or interest-
bearing debt they are more viable to engage in classification shifting than firms with low financial
debt. Thanh et al. (2020) threshold on 33% financial debt to total assets seems to be viable
in this strong institutional setting as well. Investors and creditors should take this into account
when scrutinizing the accounts of firms with high financial debt, as it may imply that the earnings
quality is low. In the low debt regime total liabilities to total assets appear to be a better indication
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upon the motivation for classification shifting, and as such should warn investors. As there are
many ways of defining debt levels and ratios, there might be other ratios and/or threshold levels
that might better delineate the relation between debt and classification shifting. This study fail
in finding a relationship between firms who give prominence to alternative performance measures
and their debt levels. However, the relatively small sample size might be a contributing to this
result.
The principle based IFRS standards are slowly being phased inn around the world, and as this
opens more up for classification shifting than former rule-based accounting standards might have
done. One explanation to why firms see classification shifting as a viable tool in this setting, might
be that IFRS allows managers to use their judgment when it comes to expense classification. This
has implications for IASB, as to put more focus on regulating classification of line items within
the income statement. Further it has implications for both investors and creditors. Valuation of
a firm based upon alternative performance measures which are not described, should be carefully
considered as firms could artificially increase those with the use of classification shifting. Creditors
on their hand must be vigilant as to consider if covenants based upon pro forma measures should
be used, as firms might shift expenses to avoid breaching them. Extensive use of alternative
performance measures, or high financial debt might be indications to look for if one suspects that
firm uses classification shifting.
There is still relatively little research on classification shifting in different contexts all over, and
further research is needed in this field in order to find out if there exist a regulatory gap that needs
to be filled. This could for example be a comparison between IFRS and non-IFRS reporting firms
located in the same environment. Other studies with different approaches with regards to defining
firms as APM prominent or not is also encouraged, as it might create a better understanding if
firms exploit non-IFRS measures. As debt levels could be measured in a variety of different ways
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You can use this list to carry out a final check of your submission before you send it to the journal for
review. Please check the relevant section in this Guide for Authors for more details.
Ensure that the following items are present:
One author has been designated as the corresponding author with contact details:
• E-mail address
• Full postal address
All necessary files have been uploaded:
Manuscript:
• Include keywords
• All figures (include relevant captions)
• All tables (including titles, description, footnotes)
• Ensure all figure and table citations in the text match the files provided
• Indicate clearly if color should be used for any figures in print
Graphical Abstracts / Highlights files (where applicable)
Supplemental files (where applicable)
Further considerations
• Manuscript has been 'spell checked' and 'grammar checked'
• All references mentioned in the Reference List are cited in the text, and vice versa
• Permission has been obtained for use of copyrighted material from other sources (including the
Internet)
• A competing interests statement is provided, even if the authors have no competing interests to
declare
• Journal policies detailed in this guide have been reviewed
• Text portions should be double spaced
For further information, visit our Support Center.
BEFORE YOU BEGIN
New Submissions
Submission to this journal proceeds totally online and you will be guided stepwise through
the creation and uploading of your files. The system automatically converts source files to
a single PDF file of the article, which is used in the peer-review process. Please note that
even though manuscript source files are converted to PDF files at submission for the review
process, these source files are needed for further processing after acceptance. All correspondence,
including notification of the Editor's decision and requests for revision, takes place by e-mail
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refundable. A paper may be rejected by the Editor without being sent for review, should the Editor
view the paper as unsuitable for the journal in terms of quality or scope, or should a paper not adhere
to the style requirements as outlined in the Guide for Authors.
You may request waiver of the submission fee if one or more of the authors is a JIAAT Editorial Board
member or has done two or more reviews for JIAAT in the 36 months prior to submission.
The submission fees are used to support journal related activities.
Ethics in publishing
Please see our information pages on Ethics in publishing and Ethical guidelines for journal publication.
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Declaration of interest
All authors must disclose any financial and personal relationships with other people or organizations
that could inappropriately influence (bias) their work. Examples of potential competing interests
include employment, consultancies, stock ownership, honoraria, paid expert testimony, patent
applications/registrations, and grants or other funding. Authors must disclose any interests in two
places: 1. A summary declaration of interest statement in the title page file (if double anonymized) or
the manuscript file (if single anonymized). If there are no interests to declare then please state this:
'Declarations of interest: none'. This summary statement will be ultimately published if the article is
accepted. 2. Detailed disclosures as part of a separate Declaration of Interest form, which forms part
of the journal's official records. It is important for potential interests to be declared in both places
and that the information matches. More information.
Submission declaration and verification
Submission of an article implies that the work described has not been published previously (except in
the form of an abstract, a published lecture or academic thesis, see 'Multiple, redundant or concurrent
publication' for more information), that it is not under consideration for publication elsewhere, that
its publication is approved by all authors and tacitly or explicitly by the responsible authorities where
the work was carried out, and that, if accepted, it will not be published elsewhere in the same form, in
English or in any other language, including electronically without the written consent of the copyright-
holder. To verify originality, your article may be checked by the originality detection service Crossref
Similarity Check.
Use of inclusive language
Inclusive language acknowledges diversity, conveys respect to all people, is sensitive to differences,
and promotes equal opportunities. Content should make no assumptions about the beliefs or
commitments of any reader; contain nothing which might imply that one individual is superior to
another on the grounds of age, gender, race, ethnicity, culture, sexual orientation, disability or health
condition; and use inclusive language throughout. Authors should ensure that writing is free from bias,
stereotypes, slang, reference to dominant culture and/or cultural assumptions. We advise to seek
gender neutrality by using plural nouns ("clinicians, patients/clients") as default/wherever possible
to avoid using "he, she," or "he/she." We recommend avoiding the use of descriptors that refer to
personal attributes such as age, gender, race, ethnicity, culture, sexual orientation, disability or health
condition unless they are relevant and valid. These guidelines are meant as a point of reference to
help identify appropriate language but are by no means exhaustive or definitive.
Author contributions
For transparency, we encourage authors to submit an author statement file outlining their individual
contributions to the paper using the relevant CRediT roles: Conceptualization; Data curation;
Formal analysis; Funding acquisition; Investigation; Methodology; Project administration; Resources;
Software; Supervision; Validation; Visualization; Roles/Writing - original draft; Writing - review &
editing. Authorship statements should be formatted with the names of authors first and CRediT role(s)
following. More details and an example
Changes to authorship
Authors are expected to consider carefully the list and order of authors before submitting their
manuscript and provide the definitive list of authors at the time of the original submission. Any
addition, deletion or rearrangement of author names in the authorship list should be made only
before the manuscript has been accepted and only if approved by the journal Editor. To request such
a change, the Editor must receive the following from the corresponding author: (a) the reason
for the change in author list and (b) written confirmation (e-mail, letter) from all authors that they
agree with the addition, removal or rearrangement. In the case of addition or removal of authors,
this includes confirmation from the author being added or removed.
Only in exceptional circumstances will the Editor consider the addition, deletion or rearrangement of
authors after the manuscript has been accepted. While the Editor considers the request, publication
of the manuscript will be suspended. If the manuscript has already been published in an online issue,
any requests approved by the Editor will result in a corrigendum.
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Role of the funding source
You are requested to identify who provided financial support for the conduct of the research and/or
preparation of the article and to briefly describe the role of the sponsor(s), if any, in study design; in
the collection, analysis and interpretation of data; in the writing of the report; and in the decision to
submit the article for publication. If the funding source(s) had no such involvement then this should
be stated.
Open access
Please visit our Open Access page for more information.
Elsevier Researcher Academy
Researcher Academy is a free e-learning platform designed to support early and mid-career
researchers throughout their research journey. The "Learn" environment at Researcher Academy
offers several interactive modules, webinars, downloadable guides and resources to guide you through
the process of writing for research and going through peer review. Feel free to use these free resources
to improve your submission and navigate the publication process with ease.
Language (usage and editing services)
Please write your text in good English (American or British usage is accepted, but not a mixture of
these). Authors who feel their English language manuscript may require editing to eliminate possible
grammatical or spelling errors and to conform to correct scientific English may wish to use the English
Language Editing service available from Elsevier's Author Services.
PREPARATION
Peer review
This journal operates a double anonymized review process. All contributions will be initially assessed
by the editor for suitability for the journal. Papers deemed suitable are then typically sent to a
minimum of two independent expert reviewers to assess the scientific quality of the paper. The Editor
is responsible for the final decision regarding acceptance or rejection of articles. The Editor's decision
is final. Editors are not involved in decisions about papers which they have written themselves or have
been written by family members or colleagues or which relate to products or services in which the
editor has an interest. Any such submission is subject to all of the journal's usual procedures, with
peer review handled independently of the relevant editor and their research groups. More information
on types of peer review.
Double-blind review
This journal uses double-blind review, which means the identities of the authors are concealed from
the reviewers, and vice versa. More information is available on our website. To facilitate this, please
include the following separately:
Title page (with author details): This should include the title, authors' names, affiliations,
acknowledgements and any Declaration of Interest statement, and a complete address for the
corresponding author including an e-mail address.
Blinded manuscript (no author details): The main body of the paper (including the references, figures
and tables) should not include any identifying information, such as the authors' names or affiliations.
Use of wordprocessing software
It is important that the file be saved in the native format of the wordprocessor used. The text should
be in single-column format. Keep the layout of the text as simple as possible. Most formatting codes
will be removed and replaced on processing the article. In particular, do not use the wordprocessor's
options to justify text or to hyphenate words. However, do use bold face, italics, subscripts,
superscripts etc. Do not embed "graphically designed" equations or tables, but prepare these using the
wordprocessor's facility. When preparing tables, if you are using a table grid, use only one grid for each
individual table and not a grid for each row. If no grid is used, use tabs, not spaces, to align columns.
The electronic text should be prepared in a way very similar to that of conventional manuscripts (see
also the Guide to Publishing with Elsevier: https://www.elsevier.com/guidepublication). Do not import
the figures into the text file but, instead, indicate their approximate locations directly in the electronic
text and on the manuscript. See also the section on Electronic illustrations.
Article structure
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Subdivision - numbered sections
Divide your article into clearly defined and numbered sections. Subsections should be numbered
1.1 (then 1.1.1, 1.1.2, ...), 1.2, etc. (the abstract is not included in section numbering). Use this
numbering also for internal cross-referencing: do not just refer to 'the text'. Any subsection may be
given a brief heading. Each heading should appear on its own separate line.
Introduction
State the objectives of the work and provide an adequate background, avoiding a detailed literature
survey or a summary of the results.
Material and methods
Provide sufficient details to allow the work to be reproduced by an independent researcher. Methods
that are already published should be summarized, and indicated by a reference. If quoting directly
from a previously published method, use quotation marks and also cite the source. Any modifications
to existing methods should also be described.
Theory/calculation
A Theory section should extend, not repeat, the background to the article already dealt with in the
Introduction and lay the foundation for further work. In contrast, a Calculation section represents a
practical development from a theoretical basis.
Results
Results should be clear and concise.
Discussion
This should explore the significance of the results of the work, not repeat them. A combined Results
and Discussion section is often appropriate. Avoid extensive citations and discussion of published
literature.
Conclusions
The main conclusions of the study may be presented in a short Conclusions section, which may stand
alone or form a subsection of a Discussion or Results and Discussion section.
Appendices
If there is more than one appendix, they should be identified as A, B, etc. Formulae and equations in
appendices should be given separate numbering: Eq. (A.1), Eq. (A.2), etc.; in a subsequent appendix,
Eq. (B.1) and so on. Similarly for tables and figures: Table A.1; Fig. A.1, etc.
Essential title page information
• Title. Concise and informative. Titles are often used in information-retrieval systems. Avoid
abbreviations and formulae where possible.
• Author names and affiliations. Please clearly indicate the given name(s) and family name(s)
of each author and check that all names are accurately spelled. You can add your name between
parentheses in your own script behind the English transliteration. Present the authors' affiliation
addresses (where the actual work was done) below the names. Indicate all affiliations with a lower-
case superscript letter immediately after the author's name and in front of the appropriate address.
Provide the full postal address of each affiliation, including the country name and the e-mail address
of each author.
• Corresponding author. Clearly indicate who will handle correspondence at all stages of refereeing
and publication, also post-publication. This responsibility includes answering any future queries about
Methodology and Materials. Ensure that the e-mail address is given and that contact details
are kept up to date by the corresponding author.
• Present/permanent address. If an author has moved since the work described in the article was
done, or was visiting at the time, a 'Present address' (or 'Permanent address') may be indicated as
a footnote to that author's name. The address at which the author actually did the work must be
retained as the main, affiliation address. Superscript Arabic numerals are used for such footnotes.
Highlights
Highlights are optional yet highly encouraged for this journal, as they increase the discoverability of
your article via search engines. They consist of a short collection of bullet points that capture the
novel results of your research as well as new methods that were used during the study (if any). Please
have a look at the examples here: example Highlights.
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Highlights should be submitted in a separate editable file in the online submission system. Please
use 'Highlights' in the file name and include 3 to 5 bullet points (maximum 85 characters, including
spaces, per bullet point).
Abstract
A concise and factual abstract is required (which does not exceed 200 words). The abstract should
state briefly the purpose of the research, the principal results and major conclusions. An abstract
is often presented separately from the article, so it must be able to stand alone. For this reason,
References should be avoided, but if essential, then cite the author(s) and year(s). Also, non-standard
or uncommon abbreviations should be avoided, but if essential they must be defined at their first
mention in the abstract itself.
Keywords
Immediately after the abstract, provide a maximum of 6 keywords, using American spelling and
avoiding general and plural terms and multiple concepts (avoid, for example, 'and', 'of'). Be sparing
with abbreviations: only abbreviations firmly established in the field may be eligible. These keywords
will be used for indexing purposes.
Abbreviations
Define abbreviations when first used in text. Such abbreviations that are unavoidable in the abstract
must also be defined at their first mention there. Ensure consistency of abbreviations throughout
the article.
Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements list those individuals who provided help during the research (e.g., making
suggestions, providing language help, writing assistance, or proofreading the article, etc.). Before
paper acceptance, include them on the title page. After paper acceptance, put them in a separate
section at the end of the article before the references.
Formatting of funding sources
List funding sources in this standard way to facilitate compliance to funder's requirements:
Funding: This work was supported by the National Institutes of Health [grant numbers xxxx, yyyy];
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Seattle, WA [grant number zzzz]; and the United States Institutes
of Peace [grant number aaaa].
It is not necessary to include detailed descriptions on the program or type of grants and awards. When
funding is from a block grant or other resources available to a university, college, or other research
institution, submit the name of the institute or organization that provided the funding.
If no funding has been provided for the research, please include the following sentence:
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or
not-for-profit sectors.
Mathematical notation
Use typewritten letters, numbers, and symbols wherever possible. Identify boldface, script letters,
etc., the first time they occur. Distinguish between Arabic "1" and the letter "l" and between zero and
the letter "O", capital or lower case, wherever confusion might result.
Please submit math equations as editable text and not as images. Present simple formulae in
line with normal text where possible and use the solidus (/) instead of a horizontal line for small
fractional terms, e.g., X/Y. In principle, variables are to be presented in italics. Powers of e are often
more conveniently denoted by exp. Number consecutively any equations that have to be displayed
separately from the text (if referred to explicitly in the text).
Footnotes
Footnotes should be used sparingly. Number them consecutively throughout the article. Many word
processors can build footnotes into the text, and this feature may be used. Otherwise, please indicate
the position of footnotes in the text and list the footnotes themselves separately at the end of the
article. Do not include footnotes in the Reference list.
References
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References and Citations
Every reference cited in the text must also present in the reference list (and vice versa).
References in the body of the text:
If single author citation is part of the sentence: Campbell (2003)
If single author citation is not part of the sentence: (Campbell, 2003)
If two author citation is part of the sentence: Jones and Ahearne (2004)
If two author citation is not part of the sentence (Jones & Ahearne, 2004)
If citation has three or more authors and is part of sentence: Brown et al. (2020).
If citation has three or more authors and is not part of sentence: (Brown et al., 2020).
Groups of references can be listed either first alphabetically and then chronologically, or vice versa.
Examples: (Allan, 1999, 2000a, 2000b; Allan and Jones, 1992; Hope et al., 2005) or (Jones, 1999;
Allan, 2000; Kramer et al., 2010).
References list:
Only the first word, the first word after a colon or dash, and proper names are capitalized in the
title of a cited work. This also applies to the title of the manuscript. Book titles, dissertation titles
and other titles are placed in italics as are the names of journals. References must be arranged first
alphabetically by author last name and then if necessary, further sorted chronologically. More than
one reference from the same author(s) in the same year must be identified by the letters 'a', 'b', 'c',
etc., placed after the year of publication. Use of DOI is required if available, and are placed at the end
of the journal reference. If no DOI has been assigned and you are accessing the periodical online,
use the URL of the website from which you are retrieving the periodical. Do NOT number references
listed in the references at the end of the manuscript and do NOT refer to references by number in
the text of the manuscript.
Examples
References to journal publications:
Seal, W. (2006). Management accounting and corporate governance: An institutional
interpretation of the agency problem. Management Accounting Research, 17 (4),
389-408.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mar.2006.05.001.
Citron, D.B., Taffler, R.J., & Uang, J.-Y. (2008). Delays in reporting price-sensitive
information: The case of going concern. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 27 (1),
19-37.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2007.11.003.
Reference to a journal publication with an article number:
Van der Geer, J., Hanraads, J.A.J., & Lupton, R.A. (2018). The art of writing a scientific article. Heliyon,
Article e00205. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2018.e00205.
Reference to a book: Strunk, W., Jr., & White, E. B. (2000). The elements of style. (4th ed.). Longman.
Reference to a chapter in an edited book:
Mettam, G. R., & Adams, L. B. (2009). How to prepare an electronic version of your article. In B. S.
Jones, & R. Z. Smith (Eds.), Introduction to the electronic age (pp. 281-304). New York: E-Publishing
Inc.
Reference to a website [In addition to the author(s), provide the full URL as well as the date it was
last accessed.]:
Powertech Systems. (2015). Lithium-ion vs lead-acid cost analysis. Retrieved
from http://www.powertechsystems.eu/home/tech-corner/lithium-ion-vs-lead-acid-cost-analysis/.
Accessed January 6, 2016
Reference to a dataset:
Oguro, M., Imahiro, S., Saito, S.,& Nakashizuka, T. (2015). Mortality data for Japanese oak wilt disease
and surrounding forest compositions. Mendeley Data, v1. https://doi.org/10.17632/ xwj98nb39r.1.
Reference to a conference paper or poster presentation:
AUTHOR INFORMATION PACK 7 Feb 2021 www.elsevier.com/locate/intaat 10
Engle, E.K., Cash, T.F., & Jarry, J.L. (2009, November). The Body Image Behaviors Inventory-3:
Development and validation of the Body Image Compulsive Actions and Body Image Avoidance Scales.
Poster session presentation at the meeting of the Association for Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies,
New York, NY.
Theses, reports, and other unpublished material: Style as journal article with as much source
information as possible. Internet citations: In addition to the author(s), provide the full URL as well
as the date it was accessed.
Unpublished results and personal communications are not recommended in the reference list, but
may be mentioned in the text. If these references are included in the reference list they should follow
the standard reference style of the journal and should include a substitution of the publication date
with either 'Unpublished results' or 'Personal communication'. Citation of a reference as 'in press'
implies that the item has been accepted for publication.
Citations should follow the referencing style used by the American Psychological Association. You are
referred to the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, Seventh Edition, ISBN
978-1-4338-3215-4, copies of which may be ordered online.
Reference management software
Most Elsevier journals have their reference template available in many of the most popular reference
management software products. These include all products that support Citation Style Language
styles, such as Mendeley. Using citation plug-ins from these products, authors only need to select
the appropriate journal template when preparing their article, after which citations and bibliographies
will be automatically formatted in the journal's style. If no template is yet available for this journal,
please follow the format of the sample references and citations as shown in this Guide. If you use
reference management software, please ensure that you remove all field codes before submitting
the electronic manuscript. More information on how to remove field codes from different reference
management software.
Users of Mendeley Desktop can easily install the reference style for this journal by clicking the following
link:
http://open.mendeley.com/use-citation-style/journal-of-international-accounting-auditing-and-taxation
When preparing your manuscript, you will then be able to select this style using the Mendeley plug-




• Make sure you use uniform lettering and sizing of your original artwork.
• Embed the used fonts if the application provides that option.
• Aim to use the following fonts in your illustrations: Arial, Courier, Times New Roman, Symbol, or
use fonts that look similar.
• Number the illustrations according to their sequence in the text.
• Use a logical naming convention for your artwork files.
• Provide captions to illustrations separately.
• Size the illustrations close to the desired dimensions of the published version.
• Submit each illustration as a separate file.
• Ensure that color images are accessible to all, including those with impaired color vision.
A detailed guide on electronic artwork is available.
You are urged to visit this site; some excerpts from the detailed information are given here.
Formats
If your electronic artwork is created in a Microsoft Office application (Word, PowerPoint, Excel) then
please supply 'as is' in the native document format.
Regardless of the application used other than Microsoft Office, when your electronic artwork is
finalized, please 'Save as' or convert the images to one of the following formats (note the resolution
requirements for line drawings, halftones, and line/halftone combinations given below):
EPS (or PDF): Vector drawings, embed all used fonts.
TIFF (or JPEG): Color or grayscale photographs (halftones), keep to a minimum of 300 dpi.
TIFF (or JPEG): Bitmapped (pure black & white pixels) line drawings, keep to a minimum of 1000 dpi.
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TIFF (or JPEG): Combinations bitmapped line/half-tone (color or grayscale), keep to a minimum of
500 dpi.
Please do not:
• Supply files that are optimized for screen use (e.g., GIF, BMP, PICT, WPG); these typically have a
low number of pixels and limited set of colors;
• Supply files that are too low in resolution;
• Submit graphics that are disproportionately large for the content.
Color artwork
Please make sure that artwork files are in an acceptable format (TIFF (or JPEG), EPS (or PDF), or
MS Office files) and with the correct resolution. If, together with your accepted article, you submit
usable color figures then Elsevier will ensure, at no additional charge, that these figures will appear
in color online (e.g., ScienceDirect and other sites) regardless of whether or not these illustrations
are reproduced in color in the printed version. For color reproduction in print, you will receive
information regarding the costs from Elsevier after receipt of your accepted article. Please
indicate your preference for color: in print or online only. Further information on the preparation of
electronic artwork.
Figure captions
Ensure that each illustration has a caption. Supply captions separately, not attached to the figure. A
caption should comprise a brief title (not on the figure itself) and a description of the illustration. Keep
text in the illustrations themselves to a minimum but explain all symbols and abbreviations used.
Text graphics
Text graphics may be embedded in the text at the appropriate position. See further under Electronic
artwork.
Tables
Please submit tables as editable text and not as images. Tables can be placed either next to the
relevant text in the article, or on separate page(s) at the end. Number tables consecutively in
accordance with their appearance in the text and place any table notes below the table body. Be
sparing in the use of tables and ensure that the data presented in them do not duplicate results
described elsewhere in the article. Please avoid using vertical rules and shading in table cells.
Journal abbreviations source
Journal names should be abbreviated according to the List of Title Word Abbreviations.
Video
Elsevier accepts video material and animation sequences to support and enhance your scientific
research. Authors who have video or animation files that they wish to submit with their article are
strongly encouraged to include links to these within the body of the article. This can be done in the
same way as a figure or table by referring to the video or animation content and noting in the body
text where it should be placed. All submitted files should be properly labeled so that they directly
relate to the video file's content. In order to ensure that your video or animation material is directly
usable, please provide the file in one of our recommended file formats with a preferred maximum
size of 150 MB per file, 1 GB in total. Video and animation files supplied will be published online in
the electronic version of your article in Elsevier Web products, including ScienceDirect. Please supply
'stills' with your files: you can choose any frame from the video or animation or make a separate
image. These will be used instead of standard icons and will personalize the link to your video data. For
more detailed instructions please visit our video instruction pages. Note: since video and animation
cannot be embedded in the print version of the journal, please provide text for both the electronic
and the print version for the portions of the article that refer to this content.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material such as applications, images and sound clips, can be published with your
article to enhance it. Submitted supplementary items are published exactly as they are received (Excel
or PowerPoint files will appear as such online). Please submit your material together with the article
and supply a concise, descriptive caption for each supplementary file. If you wish to make changes to
supplementary material during any stage of the process, please make sure to provide an updated file.
Do not annotate any corrections on a previous version. Please switch off the 'Track Changes' option
in Microsoft Office files as these will appear in the published version.
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Research data
This journal encourages and enables you to share data that supports your research publication
where appropriate, and enables you to interlink the data with your published articles. Research data
refers to the results of observations or experimentation that validate research findings. To facilitate
reproducibility and data reuse, this journal also encourages you to share your software, code, models,
algorithms, protocols, methods and other useful materials related to the project.
Below are a number of ways in which you can associate data with your article or make a statement
about the availability of your data when submitting your manuscript. If you are sharing data in one of
these ways, you are encouraged to cite the data in your manuscript and reference list. Please refer to
the "References" section for more information about data citation. For more information on depositing,
sharing and using research data and other relevant research materials, visit the research data page.
Data linking
If you have made your research data available in a data repository, you can link your article directly to
the dataset. Elsevier collaborates with a number of repositories to link articles on ScienceDirect with
relevant repositories, giving readers access to underlying data that gives them a better understanding
of the research described.
There are different ways to link your datasets to your article. When available, you can directly link
your dataset to your article by providing the relevant information in the submission system. For more
information, visit the database linking page.
For supported data repositories a repository banner will automatically appear next to your published
article on ScienceDirect.
In addition, you can link to relevant data or entities through identifiers within the text of your
manuscript, using the following format: Database: xxxx (e.g., TAIR: AT1G01020; CCDC: 734053;
PDB: 1XFN).
Mendeley Data
This journal supports Mendeley Data, enabling you to deposit any research data (including raw and
processed data, video, code, software, algorithms, protocols, and methods) associated with your
manuscript in a free-to-use, open access repository. During the submission process, after uploading
your manuscript, you will have the opportunity to upload your relevant datasets directly to Mendeley
Data. The datasets will be listed and directly accessible to readers next to your published article online.
For more information, visit the Mendeley Data for journals page.
Data in Brief
You have the option of converting any or all parts of your supplementary or additional raw data into
a data article published in Data in Brief. A data article is a new kind of article that ensures that your
data are actively reviewed, curated, formatted, indexed, given a DOI and made publicly available
to all upon publication (watch this video describing the benefits of publishing your data in Data in
Brief). You are encouraged to submit your data article for Data in Brief as an additional item directly
alongside the revised version of your manuscript. If your research article is accepted, your data article
will automatically be transferred over to Data in Brief where it will be editorially reviewed, published
open access and linked to your research article on ScienceDirect. Please note an open access fee is
payable for publication in Data in Brief. Full details can be found on the Data in Brief website. Please
use this template to write your Data in Brief data article.
Data statement
To foster transparency, we encourage you to state the availability of your data in your submission.
This may be a requirement of your funding body or institution. If your data is unavailable to access
or unsuitable to post, you will have the opportunity to indicate why during the submission process,
for example by stating that the research data is confidential. The statement will appear with your
published article on ScienceDirect. For more information, visit the Data Statement page.
AFTER ACCEPTANCE
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Copyright
Upon acceptance of an article, authors will be asked to complete a 'Journal Publishing Agreement' (see
more information on this). An e-mail will be sent to the corresponding author confirming receipt of
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